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Seeking “the SEC’s Full Protection”: A
Critique of the New Frontier in Municipal
Securities Enforcement
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INTRODUCTION
The municipal securities market has become increasingly
complex over the past four decades. The market is over fifteen
times larger today than it was in 1975, with an estimated $3.7
trillion of principal outstanding and around forty-four thousand
distinct state and local issuers accessing the market to raise
capital. 1 Regulators have cautioned that “[t]he opacity of this
market is unrivaled,” 2 and they have expressed “deep[ ] concern[ ] that the perfect municipal storm may be brewing.” 3 Exacerbating such fears is the increasing participation of individual or
“retail” investors in the primary and secondary markets:
through the 1970s, the majority of municipal bond purchasers
were sophisticated investors, banks, and insurance companies;
today, individual investors hold more than 75 percent of outstanding municipal securities. 4 Arthur Levitt Jr, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has
† BA 2010, University of Virginia; JD Candidate 2016, The University of Chicago
Law School.
1
See US Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the Municipal Securities
Market *1 & n 1 (July 31, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/2SU3-T985. Another source
has estimated that there are sixty thousand municipal securities issuers in the United
States. See Christine Sgarlata Chung, Municipal Securities: The Crisis of State and Local Government Indebtedness, Systemic Costs of Low Default Rates, and Opportunities for
Reform, 34 Cardozo L Rev 1455, 1485 (2013). In 1975, there was $235.4 billion of municipal securities outstanding. SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market at *1 n 1
(cited in note 1).
2
Arthur Levitt Jr, Muni Bonds Need Better Oversight (Wall St J, May 9, 2009),
archived at http://perma.cc/6MGH-A72J.
3
Elisse B. Walter, Speech by SEC Commissioner: Regulation of the Municipal Securities Market; Investors Are Not Second-Class Citizens (SEC, Oct 28, 2009), archived at
http://perma.cc/D4NT-XSGY.
4
SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market at *v, 12 (cited in note 1).
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urged reform in the municipal securities market precisely because individual, presumably less sophisticated investors “need
the SEC’s full protection.” 5
This heightened attention has culminated in a robust new
regime of enforcement against municipal issuers who appear to
have fraudulently misrepresented crucial aspects of their financial health to investors. Enforcement activity over the past six
years has resulted in several notable SEC firsts: for the first
time ever, the SEC has charged state governments with violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, secured monetary fines against local government officials and municipalities despite the traditional notion that government
entities are immune from such penalties, and subjected official
and legislative communications between local governments and
their citizens to liability for fraudulent misrepresentation. 6
This Comment serves two purposes. First, it presents a narrative of the SEC’s recent enforcement activity in the municipal
securities market, which recent scholarship has not yet provided. Second, it serves as a starting point for a much-needed critical analysis of the SEC’s newly invasive role in public finance.
Part I provides background on the form and function of the municipal securities market and highlights recent trends in SEC
enforcement activity. It concludes by contextualizing the SEC’s
activity within the broader national dilemma of local fiscal distress. Part II casts doubt on the theoretical soundness of the
SEC’s core justification for heightened enforcement activity in
this area—that is, the protection of unsophisticated bondholders
through greater market transparency—by demonstrating that
local residents suffer more-significant and more-immediate
harms than outside investors do when an issuer commits disclosure fraud. Part III builds on this assertion by identifying the
ways in which the SEC’s recent activity is conceptually and doctrinally misguided. The analysis demonstrates that the SEC’s
current enforcement tactics are poorly tailored to the problems
they are intended to remedy. The Conclusion argues that a punitive enforcement regime is not a wise solution to the widespread
problem of fiscal mismanagement among local governments, and
it then presents possible alternatives to the SEC’s approach.

5
6

Levitt, Muni Bonds Need Better Oversight (cited in note 2).
See Part I.C.
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I. THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET AND THE CHANGING
ROLE OF THE SEC
The public market for municipal bonds is an important
source of financing for state and local governments, and it provides individual investors with low-risk investment opportunities. While it bears similarities to the corporate-securities markets, the municipal market poses unique challenges to
regulators, and Congress has made clear that the federal government should play a relatively limited role in overseeing government issuers. This Part provides background on the mechanics of the market and the relevant regulatory framework. Parts
I.A and I.B introduce the fundamental components of the municipal securities market and the baseline legal regime that governs it. Part I.C surveys the SEC’s recent enforcement activity
against government issuers and officials, highlighting the novel
doctrinal approaches that the SEC has pursued. Part I.D considers the interplay between the SEC’s new frontier—which focuses narrowly on issuer disclosure in the bond market—and the
more complex problem of fiscal distress currently plaguing many
state and local governments.
A. The Form and Function of Municipal Bonds
To understand the context of the SEC’s recent enforcement
activity, it is important to note that municipal bonds are bought
and sold in two distinct markets: the primary, or “new issue,”
market and the secondary, trading market. The primary market
involves a municipal government’s initial offering of a new bond
issue to the investing public. 7 In a primary issuance, the issuer
works with an underwriter and other third parties to develop a
bond offering and to bring it to market. 8 The secondary market
involves the open trading of bonds after their initial issuance. 9
Local governments play an important role in the primary market

7
See The Underwriting Process (MSRB), archived at http://perma.cc/DL8D-NEPZ
(“Municipal bonds may be purchased in the initial offering of the bonds, typically
through municipal securities dealers that underwrite the bonds. . . . This type of transaction may be referred to as a primary market transaction or a new issue transaction.”).
8
See id (noting that “the bond offering process is a coordinated effort among various professionals” and the issuing entity).
9
The Secondary Market Process (MSRB), archived at http://perma.cc/A59B-AWX6
(“After the initial sales of a new issue have been completed in the underwriting process,
the bonds may continue to be bought and sold throughout the life of the security in what
is generally called the secondary market.”).
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by communicating with advisors and investors about the nature
and purpose of a given issuance, but they are generally not involved in the secondary trading of their bonds (nor do they directly benefit from secondary trading). As this Section discusses,
the primary market is an important source of capital for local
governments, and much of the SEC’s most aggressive recent enforcement activity focuses on the manner in which local governments communicate with their direct investors.
1. The primary market.
The primary municipal securities market “is critical to
building and maintaining the infrastructure of our nation.”10
State and local governments (as well as political entities like
school districts and public authorities) use bond issuances to
fund public projects, provide cash flow, finance government operations, and facilitate the development of beneficial private projects. 11 Municipal securities are largely considered to be safe investments due to their traditionally low rates of default. 12 They
also offer investors a meaningful tax advantage over traditional
corporate debt: as long as certain Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) regulations are met, interest payable on municipal bonds
is not subject to the federal income tax. 13 The benefits of the tax
exemption work both ways: by making municipal bonds more
attractive to retail and institutional investors, state and local
governments benefit from lower interest rates, making it easier
and more cost-efficient for the government to finance publicdevelopment projects. 14 In this way, tax preferences act as federal subsidies for the development of national infrastructure. Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office estimated in 2009 that
tax exemption for municipal bonds would result in an estimated
SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market at *1 (cited in note 1).
See id; Chung, 34 Cardozo L Rev at 1463–64 (cited in note 1).
12 See Chung, 34 Cardozo L Rev at 1460–62 (cited in note 1) (“Defaults are rare in
this market because issuers pledge their full ‘faith and credit’ or taxing power (for general obligation bonds) and dedicated revenue streams (for revenue bonds) as security for
bond offerings.”).
13 The federal tax exemption is governed by 26 USC § 103 and 26 CFR § 1.103-1(a).
For a straightforward discussion of the federal and state tax regimes relevant to the municipal securities market, see Philip Fischer, Investing in Municipal Bonds: How to Balance Risk and Reward for Success in Today’s Bond Market 109–27 (McGraw-Hill 2013).
14 See Congressional Budget Office and Joint Committee on Taxation, Subsidizing
Infrastructure Investment with Tax-Preferred Bonds *viii (Oct 2009), archived at
http://perma.cc/GS7F-4252 (noting that tax preferences on municipal bonds subsidize
local development by lowering the cost of debt).
10
11
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$26 billion in forgone federal revenue each year between 2008
and 2012. 15
There are two basic types of municipal securities: general
obligation bonds and revenue bonds. The two instruments are
distinguished by the nature of the capital that the issuer pledges
to secure the note. General obligation bonds are payable from
the general funds of the government issuer and typically entail
the issuing entity’s “full faith and credit.” 16 In the context of
municipal debt, the term “full faith and credit” has been subject
to reinterpretation over time, but it is widely considered to entail a commitment of all the issuer’s legally available funds, in
addition to a “good faith” commitment by the issuer to raise revenues in order to meet repayment obligations. 17 As a result,
these obligations implicate the issuer’s taxing power—that is,
government issuers can and increasingly do raise taxes to avoid
default on general obligation bonds. 18 State and local laws may
also impose requirements and limitations on a government issuer’s commitments with respect to general obligation bonds. State
law may, for example, require that debt service on outstanding
bonds be paid before operating expenses. 19 Or it may specify that
service on debt issued by cities is payable only from ad valorem
taxes. 20 The nature of the general debt obligation is therefore a
function of state law as well as the formal terms of the note being
15 See id at *5. Some academics and lawmakers have recently questioned the impact and efficacy of the tax exemption. At least one senator has called for a complete
elimination of tax-exempt status for municipal bonds. See Naomi Jagoda, Sen. Coburn:
Eliminate the Muni Tax Exemption (Bond Buyer, Dec 9, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/3D6N-GUE9 (citing Senator Thomas Coburn’s recent report highlighting
potential areas of federal tax reform). See also Harvey Galper, et al, Municipal Debt:
What Does It Buy and Who Benefits?, 67 Natl Tax J 901, 922 (2014) (finding that the tax
exemption benefits both higher-income households and lower-income households, the
latter by decreasing the cost of public education); Greg Aikman, et al, Municipal Industry Roundtable: Challenges to the Tax-Exempt Status of Municipal Bonds, 33 Mun Fin J
11, 12–17 (2012) (explaining the potential negative consequences of eliminating the tax
exemption, such as harming reliance interests, creating liquidity problems, and eliminating “an efficient source of capital for state and local governments”).
16 Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, Municipal Bonds: Understanding
Credit Risk *2 (SEC, Dec 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/K4WZ-WJTD.
17 Robert A. Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance § 8:6.2[A] (PLI 3d
ed 2011).
18 See id. See also Richard C. Schragger, Citizens versus Bondholders, 39 Fordham
Urban L J 787, 797 (2012) (arguing that historically low municipal-default rates and the
twentieth century’s “rhetoric . . . of bondholder inviolability” may be due, in part, to the
fact that taxation provides government issuers with a “fairly stable source of revenue”);
Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at § 1:6.1 (cited in note 17).
19 See Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at § 1:6.1 (cited in note 17).
20 See Sources of Repayment (MSRB), archived at http://perma.cc/C5FC-TC57.
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issued. 21 In the event of default on a general obligation bond,
bondholders may retain the right to compel a tax levy or a legislative appropriation to cover debt service. 22
Revenue bonds, on the other hand, do not carry a full faith
and credit pledge by the issuer and are instead backed by a specified, limited source of revenue, such as the revenue that the issuer expects to derive from the operation of the financed project. 23 Revenue bonds issued to finance the construction of local
water and sewer facilities, for example, might be paid out of revenues obtained through local assessments for the use of those
utilities. 24 The pledge of revenues creates a security interest defined by the contractual terms of the bond, which often provide
investors with protection in the event of Chapter 9 bankruptcy.25
It is also important to note that issuers rely heavily on the advice of financial advisors in constructing and marketing their offerings. 26 Novel reinventions of the traditional municipal debt
instruments and increasing reliance on third-party intermediaries have contributed complexity and volatility to the municipaldebt market. 27
2. The secondary market.
In contrast to the corporate-securities market, the secondary market in municipal bonds is thin and illiquid. According to
See Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at § 1:6.1 (cited in note 17).
See id (noting that “some form of mandamus to require the production of revenue
would be available” to bondholders, depending on the provisions of state law). See also
Sources of Repayment (cited in note 20).
23 See Sources of Repayment (cited in note 20) (“The issuer of a revenue bond is not
obligated to pay principal and interest on its bonds using any source other than the
source(s) specifically pledged to the bond.”); Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at § 1:6.2 (cited in note 17) (“A revenue bond is limited to a specifically identified
source of revenues.”).
24 See Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at § 1:6.2 (cited in note 17).
25 See id (explaining that revenue bonds provide the bondholder with bankruptcy
protection because the specified source of funds will be unavailable to other creditors).
The structural and legal protections afforded to investors in general obligation and revenue bonds are analyzed further in Part II.A.
26 See Robert Zipf, How Municipal Bonds Work 196–97 (Prentice Hall 1995); The
Underwriting Process (cited in note 7) (“[T]he bond offering process is a coordinated effort among various professionals [and the issuing entity].”).
27 See, for example, Arthur Levitt, Taxpayers Fleeced When Leaders Tap Muni
Market: Arthur Levitt (Bloomberg, Oct 21, 2009), archived at http://perma.cc/5KB7
-QVML. See also Walter, Regulation of the Municipal Securities Market (cited in note 3)
(“Municipal securities are securitized and both large and small municipalities use complex structured products and financial derivatives whose risks even sophisticated investors sometimes have trouble understanding.”).
21
22
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a 2012 report conducted by the SEC, municipal debt is traded on
a “buy-and-hold” basis: 28 most investors buy municipal bonds in
the primary market and hold them to maturity. 29 As a result,
“the vast majority of municipal bonds and notes do not trade
regularly in the secondary market,” 30 making it difficult to determine distinct trading or pricing patterns for a given bond. 31
Furthermore, there is no central exchange for the secondary
trading of municipal bonds: all secondary trading is conducted
over the counter through the use of brokers. 32 As the SEC has
observed, reliance on intermediaries to conduct trades increases
transaction costs for investors, who do not have open access to
the same types of trading and pricing data available to investors
in other markets. 33
The SEC has dedicated attention to reforming the secondary
market, 34 but its most recent and aggressive activity has focused
on transparency in the primary market and on the nature of
communications between issuers and direct investors. These issues are, therefore, the immediate focus of this Comment.
B. Backdoor Regulation of a Once-Backwater Market
The legal regime governing the municipal securities market
is distinct from the more familiar corporate regulatory framework. The law with respect to municipal issuers has changed
over time, but one core principle has remained constant: Congress has expressed a desire to limit the reach of federal regulatory agencies in the realm of public finance. Understanding the
evolution and current state of the law in this area is crucial to
analyzing and critiquing the SEC’s new enforcement frontier.

SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market at *v (cited in note 1).
See Paul Schultz, The Market for New Issues of Municipal Bonds: The Roles of
Transparency and Limited Access to Retail Investors, 106 J Fin Econ 492, 494 (2012).
30 Chung, 34 Cardozo L Rev at 1485 (cited in note 1). See also Schultz, 106 J Fin
Econ at 494–95 (cited in note 29) (“The majority of trades, 8.8 million of 11.3 million, are
investor purchases of bonds from dealers.”).
31 Chung, 34 Cardozo L Rev at 1485 (cited in note 1) (explaining that the resulting
lack of price transparency in the municipal bond market makes it harder for both investors and taxpayers to assess the risks of any given bond).
32 See SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market at *19–20 (cited in note 1).
33 Id at *v–vi, 2, 123.
34 See, for example, id at *112–50 (examining the structure and flaws of the secondary market and providing recommendations for improvement).
28
29
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1. Limits on direct SEC regulation.
Until the mid-1970s, the municipal securities market was a
“sleepy,” 35 “quiet backwater market” 36 with low investment risk
and minimal regulatory oversight. 37 In fact, in passing the Securities Act of 1933 38 (“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 39 (“Exchange Act”), Congress deliberately exempted municipal securities from direct federal regulation. 40 At
the time, regulation of municipal bonds seemed unnecessary in
light of both the perceived sophistication of the institutional investors that dominated the market and the fact that abuses
were uncommon. 41 More importantly, lawmakers were concerned that drawing local governments under the umbrella of
federal oversight would run afoul of the constitutional principle
of state sovereignty. 42
By the 1970s, circumstances had changed: the market had
grown to include a greater proportion of unsophisticated individual investors, and instances of fraud in the secondary market
had risen. 43 Congress responded by passing the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975 44 (“1975 Amendments”), which established
a limited scheme to regulate secondary market participants,
including underwriters, brokers, and dealers. 45 The 1975
35 Christopher Cox, Speech by SEC Chairman: Integrity in the Municipal Market
(SEC, July 18, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc/2ZR5-4HRR.
36 Erik R. Sirri, Speech by SEC Staff: Remarks to the 2008 Bond Attorney’s Workshop of the National Association of Bond Lawyers (SEC, Sept 17, 2008), archived at
http://perma.cc/Z9EC-YDXB (noting that “some may have considered [the municipal
bond market] a quiet backwater market in the past”).
37 See Chung, 34 Cardozo L Rev at 1456–58 (cited in note 1) (noting that, until the
mid-1970s, “[i]nterest rates were steady and defaults were rare”).
38 48 Stat 74, codified as amended at 15 USC § 77a et seq.
39 48 Stat 881, codified as amended at 15 USC § 78a et seq.
40 As is discussed in Part I.B.2, issuers remain subject to the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws, exposing them to SEC scrutiny and enforcement. Division of
Market Regulation, Staff Report on the Municipal Securities Market *1, 9 n 9, Appendix
A (SEC, Sept 1993), archived at http://perma.cc/PH99-QE5L.
41 Id at *1, Appendix A.
42 See id at *1, 8 n 3, Appendix A.
43 Id at *3, Appendix A. The 1975 Amendments were also, and more directly,
spurred by the New York City bond crisis of the 1970s. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Financial Federalism and the Short, Happy Life of Municipal Securities Regulation, 34 J Corp
L 739, 742 (2009).
44 Pub L No 94-29, 89 Stat 97, codified as amended in various sections of Title 15.
45 See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Report of the Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, S Rep No 94-75, 94th Cong, 1st Sess 38–53 (1975), reprinted
in 1975 USCCAN 179, 215–31. See also SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market
at *27–29, 33–37 (cited in note 1).
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Amendments also created “a new, but limited, self-regulatory
organization,” 46 the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board
(MSRB), which holds primary rulemaking authority over the activities of private market actors. 47 The SEC retains jurisdiction
over the MSRB’s rulemaking activities and remains responsible
for enforcement of the securities laws and rules promulgated by
the MSRB. 48
While the 1975 Amendments paved the way for increased
oversight of private market participants, Congress remained reluctant to impose regulatory burdens on government issuers
themselves. Congress preserved the long-standing exemption of
municipal securities from both the registration requirements of
the Securities Act and the mandatory periodic-reporting regime
prescribed by the Exchange Act. 49 Both these exemptions remain
in effect today. 50 Furthermore, a core provision of the 1975
Amendments—commonly referred to as the Tower Amendment—expressly prohibits the SEC and the MSRB from directly
mandating public disclosures by municipal issuers prior to a
primary bond issuance. 51 It establishes that
[n]either the Commission nor the Board is authorized under
this chapter, by rule or regulation, to require any issuer of
municipal securities, directly or indirectly through a purchaser or prospective purchaser of securities from the issuer, to file with the Commission or the Board prior to the sale
of such securities by the issuer any application, report, or
document in connection with the issuance, sale, or distribution of such securities. 52
The Tower Amendment is somewhat narrow: by its terms, it
prohibits the SEC and the MSRB from regulating issuer disclo-

S Rep No 94-75 at 46 (cited in note 45).
See id. See also SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market at *33–36 (cited
in note 1).
48 S Rep No 94-75 at 47, 49–50 (cited in note 45).
49 See 15 USC § 77c(a)(2). See also Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement of the Commission regarding Disclosure Obligations of Municipal Securities Issuers
and Others, 59 Fed Reg 12747, 12749 (1994) (interpreting 17 CFR Parts 211, 231, and 241).
50 See Luis A. Aguilar, Statement on Making the Municipal Securities Market More
Transparent, Liquid, and Fair (SEC, Feb 13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2C8W
-VDUG (arguing that “Congress should repeal municipal securities’ exemption from the
Securities Act’s registration provisions, and from the Exchange Act’s ongoing reporting
requirements”).
51 15 USC § 78o-4(d)(1).
52 15 USC § 78o-4(d)(1).
46
47
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sure practices only prior to—not after—a given bond issuance.
Nonetheless, nothing in the existing securities laws affirmatively
authorizes the SEC to require an issuer to provide continuing
disclosure documents after an issuance has taken place and as
bonds mature. As a result, the SEC has consistently interpreted
the Tower Amendment to impose a strict limitation on its own
ability to regulate issuer disclosures at the offering stage and
over the lifetime of a bond. 53 As a result—and in stark contrast
to the highly regulated disclosure system of the corporatesecurities market—discretion as to the substance and timing of
financial disclosures lies squarely with issuers.
As the Senate report advocating for the 1975 Amendments
indicates, Congress’s rationale for maintaining a light regulatory
touch on issuers was twofold: first, in the words of the Senate
report, a new approach to issuer regulation would represent a
“radical incursion on states’ prerogatives” (an oblique reference
to baseline principles of state sovereignty); and second, Congress
was “not aware of any abuses” by municipal issuers, such that
the practical conditions of the market at the time simply did not
warrant radical congressional action. 54
The Tower Amendment’s proscription does not, however,
apply to private entities. Subsequent refinements of SEC and
MSRB rules have therefore imposed disclosure and due diligence
obligations on underwriters and other private firms involved in
public issuances. Most notably, underwriters are required under
SEC and MSRB rules to “obtain and review” offering and continuing disclosure documents prepared by the municipal issuer 55
at the time of offering and on an ongoing basis, and they must
submit copies of those statements to the MSRB for inclusion in its
central Electronic Municipal Market Access system (EMMA). 56
The express carveout of municipal entities from direct SEC
regulation has contributed to what many critics have called a

53 Under the SEC’s interpretation, “[t]he 1975 Amendments do not, by their terms,
preclude the Commission from promulgating disclosure standards in municipal offerings,
but there is no express statutory authority contained in the Exchange Act over disclosure
by municipal issuers.” SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market at *28 (cited in
note 1). The SEC presumes that the absence of express authorization prevents it from
taking steps to require issuers to file periodic postissuance disclosures.
54 S Rep No 94-75 at 44 (cited in note 45).
55 17 CFR § 240.15c2-12(b)(1).
56 See Rule G-32: Disclosures in Connection with Primary Offerings (MSRB), archived at http://perma.cc/LF5N-RX45.
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piecemeal, backdoor disclosure regime. 57 Even when disclosures
are made publicly available through EMMA, municipal issuers
are not required to follow any specific SEC rules or general accounting standards in preparing them; issuers essentially have
“carte blanche in designing their own financial statements.” 58 As
a result, disclosures lack uniformity, making it more costly for investors to collect and compare financial data across the market.59
2. Fraud liability and SEC enforcement.
While municipal issuers are not directly regulated, they are
subject to the core antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws: § 17(a) of the Securities Act, § 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
and Rule 10b-5, promulgated under § 10(b). 60 Fraud liability
arose from the 1975 Amendments, which added governments
and political subdivisions to the definition of “person” found in
§ 3(a)(9) of the Exchange Act. 61 Subsequent courts have agreed
that, by thus expanding the scope of § 3(a)(9), Congress intended
to subject municipalities to SEC enforcement under §§ 17(a) and
10(b), as well as to the implied private right of action under
§ 10(b). 62 This is yet another backdoor feature of the Tower
Amendment’s legal framework: issuer conduct is regulated not
by ex ante procedural rules but rather by ex post litigation under the enforcement discretion of the SEC and through the action of private litigants.

57 See, for example, Gabaldon, 34 J Corp L at 746, 768–69 (cited in note 43) (noting
that the current regulatory regime has been “coaxing municipal disclosure through the
barn’s back door”).
58 Id at 752–53.
59 See Darien Shanske, The Feds Are Already Here: The Federal Role in Municipal
Debt Finance, 33 Rev Bank & Fin L 795, 802 (2014) (noting that “the quality of disclosure varies widely and there are high transaction costs involved in collecting and assessing disparate data”).
60 See SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market at *29 (cited in note 1).
61 1975 Amendments § 3(2), 89 Stat at 97, codified at 15 USC § 78c(a)(9). See also
Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at § 15:2 (cited in note 17); Green v
Utah, 539 F2d 1266, 1273–74 (10th Cir 1976) (holding that the expanded definition of
the term “person” as including government entities does not abrogate sovereign immunity).
62 See, for example, Sonnenfeld v City and County of Denver, 100 F3d 744, 746–47
(10th Cir 1996) (holding that “Congress intended by its 1975 amendment to subject municipalities to the then well-established private right of action under § 10(b) when it expressly brought municipalities within the scope of that section”). See also Fippinger, The
Securities Law of Public Finance at § 15:2 (cited in note 17) (“In short, the substantive
antifraud provisions apply to any person, the definition of a person includes states and
political subdivisions, and the SEC enforcement powers extend to any person acting in
violation of the substantive provisions.”).
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The antifraud provisions differ in subtle but important
ways. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for any “person”—
including, under the Tower Amendment, any government entity—
“[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device” in contravention of SEC rules and regulations. 63 Rule 10b-5 implements § 10(b) with prohibitions of specific fraudulent practices
in connection with the sale of a security. 64 The elements of proof
for a Rule 10b-5 claim are demanding: a private plaintiff must
show that (1) the defendant made a false statement or omission
of material fact (2) with scienter (3) “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security” that (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on, and that (5) the material misstatement or omission proximately caused (6) the plaintiff’s economic loss. 65 The SEC is
relieved of the requirement to plead reliance. 66
The materiality element is a site of potential ambiguity in
the municipal context because of the unique ways in which local
governments communicate with stakeholders. In general, an
omitted or misstated fact is “material” if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable investor would have viewed the fact
“as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information
made available” to the investing public. 67 The “total mix” generally includes information that exists in the public domain and is
reasonably available to investors, including information circulated in general media. 68 But defining the outer bounds of the total mix is a fact-intensive inquiry that has been treated variably

63
64

15 USC § 78j(b).
Rule 10b-5 reads:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce . . . (a) To employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 CFR § 240.10b-5.
65 Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc v Broudo, 544 US 336, 341 (2005).
66 See Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at § 14:1.1 (cited in note 17).
67 Basic Inc v Levinson, 485 US 224, 232 (1988), quoting TSC Industries, Inc v
Northway, Inc, 426 US 438, 449 (1976).
68 See Thomas Lee Hazen, 4 Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation § 12.9
(West 6th ed 2009).
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among federal courts and the SEC, and there exist no clear judicial guidelines for applying the concept in the municipal context. 69
The coverage of § 17(a) is broader. It governs all security
sales—not just those associated with public offerings—and
makes it unlawful for any “person” (1) “to employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud”; (2) to “obtain money or property”
by means of material misstatements or omissions; or (3) to engage in any business practices that “would operate as a fraud . . .
upon the purchaser.” 70 Courts have held that charges under
§ 17(a)(2) or (3) can be tried under a negligence standard, rather
than the higher scienter standard that applies to claims under
§§ 17(a)(1) or 10(b). 71 In practice, many charges that might be
brought under Rule 10b-5 can also be crafted to fit within the
language of § 17(a), making this provision a more potent enforcement tool than § 10(b) itself. Importantly, even though the
SEC is empowered to bring charges under § 17(a), the majority
of courts have not recognized a private right of action under
§ 17(a)’s more permissive standard. 72 Private litigants face a
higher threshold and a more limited set of tools in bringing
fraud claims in both the municipal and the corporate contexts. 73
The SEC thus has significant leeway in designing the charges
that it may bring against a municipal issuer.
The SEC has additional latitude in determining the procedural route of an enforcement action. In general, the SEC is
empowered to bring a civil action against an issuer in federal
district court for an injunction or civil penalties, but it may also
pursue an administrative proceeding before an SEC administrative law judge (ALJ). 74 One of the SEC’s principal tools in the
69 See id. The SEC’s recent attempts to apply the “total mix” concept to statements
made by municipal issuers is analyzed more fully in Part I.C.2 and Part III.B.2.
70 15 USC § 77q(a).
71 See Securities and Exchange Commission v Tambone, 550 F3d 106, 125–27 (1st
Cir 2008) (explaining that liability under § 17(a)(2) is broader than under § 10(b)); Tellabs, Inc v Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd, 551 US 308, 319 (2007) (confirming that private
litigants must prove scienter under § 10(b)).
72 It is somewhat unsettled whether an implied private right of action under § 17(a)
exists, but the majority of courts have declined to recognize such a right. See Michael J.
Kaufman, 26A Securities Litigation: Damages § 19:1 (West 2014) (explaining that the
Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, as well as certain lower courts in the Sixth
Circuit, do not recognize such a private right of action, and that the Second, Fourth, and
Seventh Circuits have indicated a willingness to consider the same position).
73 See Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at § 14:1.1[A] (cited in note 17)
(outlining the aspects of antifraud law and procedure that disfavor suits brought by private litigants seeking damages awards).
74 See id at § 15:1.

05 GUIDOTTI_CMT_SA (CAC) (DO NOT DELETE)

2058

12/12/2015 2:36 PM

The University of Chicago Law Review

[82:2045

municipal context is the cease and desist order, an administrative remedy analogous to a court-ordered injunction. 75 In contrast to a court order, the SEC alone authors the terms of the
cease and desist order, allowing it to “control[ ] the script” of a
proceeding. 76 Respondents have the right to a hearing before an
ALJ, who may affirm or deny the SEC’s proposed order. 77 Final
orders are appealable to the SEC directly and, thereafter, to a
federal appellate court. 78 But the expense of the appeals process,
in addition to the fact that courts grant the SEC considerable
deference in administrative activities, 79 incentivizes parties to
not challenge proposed cease and desist orders or to otherwise
settle with the SEC before any charges are brought. 80
C.

“We’re Here to Stay”: Uncharted Territory in SEC
Enforcement

In the wake of a 2012 review of disclosure practices 81—and
amidst a recent rise in instances of municipal fiscal distress 82—
the SEC has become increasingly aggressive in levying fraud
charges against municipal issuers and local officials under

75 See 15 USC § 77h-1. See also Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at
§ 15:8.2 (cited in note 17).
76 Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at § 15:8.2 (cited in note 17).
77 See id.
78 See id.
79 Federal courts review final SEC administrative orders under a “very deferential”
substantial-evidence standard, under which the court asks whether a reasonable mind
would accept the evidentiary record before the SEC as adequate to support the SEC’s
conclusion. Dolphin and Bradbury, Inc v Securities and Exchange Commission, 512 F3d
634, 639 (DC Cir 2008), citing National Association of Securities Dealers v Securities and
Exchange Commission, 801 F2d 1415, 1419 (DC Cir 1986), and Dickinson v Zurko, 527
US 150, 162 (1999).
80 See Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at § 15:8.2 (cited in note 17).
See also Sonia A. Steinway, Comment, SEC “Monetary Penalties Speak Very Loudly,” but
What Do They Say? A Critical Analysis of the SEC’s New Enforcement Approach, 124
Yale L J 209, 226–30 (2014) (noting that parties are more incentivized to settle with the
SEC because the uncertainty of pending litigation chills relationships with customers
and demoralizes management).
81 See SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market at *56–111 (cited in note 1);
Division of Enforcement, Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation Initiative
(SEC, Nov 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6594-J974 (“[T]here is significant concern that . . . federal securities law violations involving false statements [in issuer disclosures] . . . may be widespread.”).
82 At the same time that the SEC has increased scrutiny of disclosure practices among
local issuers, a number of local governments have faced increasing financial pressures and
even insolvency. Local fiscal distress is an important backdrop to the SEC’s recent activity and is examined in more depth in Part I.D.2.
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§ 17(a), § 10(b), and Rule 10b-5. 83 The majority of its recent activity has involved administrative cease and desist orders, in
which local issuers have agreed to cease and desist from committing further violations of federal securities laws without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings of fraud. 84 To bolster these
enforcement efforts, the SEC launched the Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation Initiative (MCDC) in March
2014. 85 The MCDC was a wide-ranging self-reporting program
offering the possibility of lenient settlement terms to issuers or
private parties that admitted to violations of §§ 17(a) or 10(b) of
the federal securities laws. 86 The program ended on December 1,
2014. 87 The SEC has declined to reveal either the total number or
the substance of the reports that were filed,88 but one source from
the financial industry estimates that as many as one thousand issuers have confessed to a wide range of disclosure inadequacies. 89
While the SEC has been reluctant to notify stakeholders of its
enforcement strategy going forward, the municipal securities market has already seen a surge in enforcement activity in response to
the various violations disclosed through the program. 90 By October 2015, the SEC had reached two rounds of settlements with
municipal underwriters, and commentators expect the SEC to

83 Andrew Ceresney, current director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, recently
declared that the area of municipal disclosure is “a place we’re here to stay.” Kyle Glazier,
SEC’s Top Cop: More Muni Enforcement, Not Less (Bond Buyer, Nov 10, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/Y3BR-QAEG. This new focus comports with one of the Government
Accountability Office’s 2012 recommendations for improving the disclosure climate in the
municipal securities market. See Municipal Securities: Options for Improving Continuing Disclosure *35–36 (GAO, July 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/PHF5-JP7T (suggesting that the SEC could use its antifraud authority as “leverage to improve issuers’
adherence with continuing disclosure agreements”).
84 For a summary of recent SEC actions, see Appendix. For a discussion of the use
of cease and desist orders in the realm of municipal finance, see Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at § 15:8.2 (cited in note 17).
85 See Division of Enforcement, Municipalities Continuing Disclosure Cooperation
Initiative (cited in note 81).
86 See id.
87 Id.
88 See Kyle Glazier, Gaunt: MCDC Enforcement Actions Will Make Clear SEC’s
Views (Bond Buyer, Dec 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9L8S-C8C6.
89 See Hilary Russ, U.S. Towns, Schools Admit to Failing to Filing Financial Disclosures (Reuters, Dec 1, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/QG6Z-QRJW (noting that issuers have revealed “minor bookkeeping errors or filings late by a few days, as well as
serious breaches,” and that the violations being disclosed are “all over the map”).
90 See Glazier, Gaunt (cited in note 88) (reporting that the SEC’s Division of Enforcement plans to pursue actions against issuers and financial intermediaries who have
come forward through the MCDC).
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turn its attention to state and local issuers next. 91 Despite the
slow pace of enforcement following the MCDC, increased scrutiny in this area has already led to several novel applications of
securities law. Each of these novelties will impact the SEC’s approach toward issuer settlements going forward.
1. The SEC has pursued enforcement actions against state
governments.
In 2010, New Jersey entered into an administrative settlement with the SEC, making it “the first state ever charged by
the SEC for violations of the federal securities laws.” 92 Since
then, the SEC has settled with two additional states 93 for fraudulently failing to disclose significant pension liabilities and other
material financial risks to bond investors in violation of § 17(a).
As a condition of each settlement, the states agreed to cease and
desist from “committing or causing any violations and any future violations” of securities laws and to improve their internal
disclosure processes, but they were not required to admit any
wrongdoing nor were they subject to monetary fines. 94 The settlement with New Jersey explicitly states that, “as an issuer of
municipal securities, [New Jersey] is subject to the antifraud
provisions of the federal securities laws.” 95 A similar assertion of
91 See Jack Casey, 22 MCDC Settlements with Firms to Be Followed by Another
Round (Bond Buyer, Sept 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2CEK-YAL2; Andrew
Ackerman, SEC Charges Municipal Underwriters with Making False Statements (Wall
St J, Sept 30, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/5GMW-HJNS.
92 SEC Charges State of New Jersey for Fraudulent Municipal Bond Offerings
(SEC, Aug 18, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/N6JK-2ENE.
93 The SEC filed cease and desist orders against New Jersey on August 18, 2010,
against Illinois on March 11, 2013, and, most recently as of this writing, against Kansas
on August 11, 2014. See generally Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933, Making Findings, and Imposing a
Cease-and-Desist Order, In the Matter of State of New Jersey, Securities Act of 1933 Release No 9135, SEC Administrative Proceeding No 3-14009 (Aug 18, 2010) (available on
Westlaw at 2010 WL 3260860) (“New Jersey Order”); Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist
Proceedings pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933, Making Findings, and
Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order, In the Matter of State of Illinois, Securities Act of
1933 Release No 9389, SEC Administrative Proceeding No 3-15237 (Mar 11, 2013)
(available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 873208) (“Illinois Order”); Order Instituting Ceaseand-Desist Proceedings pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 1933, Making
Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order, In the Matter of the State of Kansas,
Securities Act of 1933 Release No 9629, SEC Administrative Proceeding No 3-16009
(Aug 11, 2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 3896055) (“Kansas Order”).
94 New Jersey Order at *14–16 (cited in note 93); Illinois Order at *8–11 (cited in
note 93); Kansas Order at *6–8 (cited in note 93).
95 New Jersey Order at *14 (cited in note 93).
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state liability is notably absent from the two more-recent settlement agreements with Illinois and Kansas, 96 but these states
did not challenge the SEC’s authority to assert the charges.
2. The SEC has expanded the basis for fraud violations to
include any public statement made by municipal
governments or officials, even outside the context of
securities disclosures.
In a 2013 administrative settlement, the SEC alleged that
the city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, violated § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 by making materially misleading statements about the
city’s failing financial health in its budget report, in its annual
and midyear financial statements, and in the mayor’s State of
the City address. 97 The SEC announced that this was “the first
time that [it had] charged a municipality for misleading statements made outside of its securities disclosure documents.” 98
Simultaneously with its press release announcing the settlement, the SEC issued an investigation report warning public officials that their public statements are part of, and can impact,
“the total mix of information available to the market” in their
securities. 99 As discussed in Part I.B.2, the “total mix” inquiry is
the standard for defining materiality in a fraud claim under
§ 17(a) or § 10(b). The SEC has, therefore, clearly established
that misleading information contained in public statements can
lead to liability under the federal securities laws.
3. Monetary penalties against government entities and
officials are now a central—and controversial—focus of
96 Unlike the New Jersey Order, which specifically asserts that states are liable under § 17(a), the Illinois Order and Kansas Order describe the mandates of that provision
more broadly. Illinois Order at *9 (cited in note 93) (“Issuers of municipal securities are
responsible for the accuracy of their disclosure documents.”); Kansas Order at *7 (cited
in note 93) (“Issuers of municipal securities must ensure that financial information contained in their disclosure documents is not materially misleading.”).
97 See Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings pursuant to Section 21C of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist
Order, In the Matter of the City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, Securities Exchange Act of
1934 Release No 69515, SEC Administrative Proceeding No 3-15316, *2 (May 6, 2013)
(available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 1869030).
98 SEC Charges City of Harrisburg for Fraudulent Public Statements (SEC, May 6,
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/G5VV-K84H.
99 US Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of Investigation in the Matter of
the City of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania concerning the Potential Liability of Public Officials
with Regard to Disclosure Obligations in the Secondary Market (May 6, 2013), archived
at http://perma.cc/L9AF-CGPA.
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the SEC’s enforcement program.
In a further attempt to add teeth to its antifraud enforcement authority, the SEC has successfully pursued monetary
penalties against several city officials and at least one municipal
government. 100 In a 2010 settlement in the Southern District of
California, the former City Manager, Auditor and Comptroller,
Deputy City Manager for Finance, and City Treasurer for the
city of San Diego all agreed to personally forfeit a combined total
of $80,000 to settle charges that they violated § 17(a) for failing
to inform investors of the city’s underfunded-pension liabilities.101 In another first-of-its-kind enforcement action, the Greater
Wenatchee Regional Events Center Public Facilities District of
Washington recently agreed to pay $20,000 in a cease and desist
proceeding in which the SEC alleged that the district made materially false statements regarding a revenue bond issued during
the 2008 financial crisis. 102 The SEC has secured monetary penalties from several additional municipal officials since these settlements 103 and has announced that it will “continue to look for
opportunities to hold individuals personally accountable for
their roles in breaking federal securities laws.” 104
Some portion of the SEC’s recent zeal for monetary penalties stems from the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 105 (“Dodd-Frank”), which authorized the
SEC to impose monetary penalties in cease and desist proceedSee Appendix.
See Former San Diego Officials Agree to Pay Financial Penalties in Municipal
Bond Fraud Case (SEC, Oct 27, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/G8TD-82V8 (noting
that this was “the first time that the SEC had secured financial penalties against city
officials in a municipal bond fraud case”). The settlement was reached after the SEC
filed charges against the officials in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California. See generally Complaint for Violations of the Federal Securities
Laws, Securities and Exchange Commission v Uberuaga, Civil Action No 08-0621 (SD
Cal filed Apr 7, 2008).
102 See Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings pursuant to Section 8A of
the Securities Act of 1933, Making Findings, and Imposing Remedial Sanctions and a
Cease-and-Desist Order, In the Matter of the Greater Wenatchee Regional Events Center
Public Facilities District, Securities Act of 1933 Release No 9471, SEC Administrative
Proceeding No 3-15602, *12 (Nov 5, 2013) (available on Westlaw at 2013 WL 5914980).
103 See, for example, SEC Charges Allen Park, Mich. and Two Former City Leaders
in Fraudulent Muni Bond Offering for Movie Studio Project (SEC, Nov 6, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/D5ZA-NL9F (noting that the Allen Park mayor has agreed to settle
the suit against him for a $10,000 monetary penalty). For a discussion on the implications of this case, see Parts I.C.4, II.C.
104 Glazier, SEC’s Top Cop (cited in note 83) (paraphrasing remarks by Ceresney,
director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement).
105 Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010).
100
101
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ings against any person. 106 As discussed in Part I.B.2, the term
“person” under § 3(a)(9) of the Exchange Act now includes municipal issuers. 107 Prior to Dodd-Frank, the SEC was permitted
to pursue monetary penalties against a municipal entity or official only through civil suits filed in federal district courts—not
through administrative proceedings. 108 One effect of Dodd-Frank
was to expand the SEC’s options and discretion in levying monetary fines against any violators of the antifraud provisions.
However, the legal propriety of demanding civil penalties
from government officials is unclear and has recently proved to
be controversial. As the Supreme Court has long held, government officials are entitled to immunity from private damages
suits as long as they are performing discretionary functions. 109
This doctrine of qualified immunity is designed to “balance[ ]
two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need
to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability
when they perform their duties reasonably.” 110 As such, the doctrine protects any officer who “reasonably believes that his or
her conduct complies with the law.” 111 The question whether this
doctrine shields public officials from federal enforcement actions, in addition to private suits, is unsettled. 112
The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the novelty of the question in a brief, unpublished opinion issued September 5, 2014, in
Securities and Exchange Commission v City of Miami.113 The
court affirmed the lower court’s holding that Michael Boudreaux,
a former Miami budget director who allegedly contributed to
misrepresentations contained in several of the city’s bondoffering documents, was not entitled to the immunity defense

Dodd-Frank § 929P(a)(1), 124 Stat at 1862–63, codified at 15 USC § 77h-1(g).
See text accompanying notes 60–62.
108 See Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at § 15:4.3 (cited in note 17).
109 Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 817–18 (1982) (holding that as long as public
officials do not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known,” their performances of discretionary functions are
protected from liability).
110 Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223, 231 (2009).
111 Id at 244.
112 See Securities and Exchange Commission v City of Miami, 2014 WL 4377831, *2
(11th Cir) (“Neither this court nor any of our sister circuits has addressed the issue of
whether municipal officials are entitled to qualified immunity in a SEC enforcement action under the federal securities laws.”).
113 2014 WL 4377831 (11th Cir), cert denied, Boudreaux v Securities and Exchange
Commission, 135 S Ct 2890 (2015).
106
107
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against the SEC’s suit for monetary penalties. 114 The reasoning
was relatively sparse: The court noted that “there is no history
at common law of civil immunities being applied as a defense to
federal enforcement actions,” 115 but it failed to acknowledge the
substantial body of case law questioning the efficacy of monetary
sanctions against government actors. 116 It further failed to observe that SEC enforcement actions against public officials are
themselves relatively uncommon.
In December 2014, the Eleventh Circuit declined to rehear
the decision, leading Boudreaux to file a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the Supreme Court on March 17, 2015. 117 The
precise question presented was “[w]hether a government officer
performing discretionary functions is entitled to a defense of
qualified immunity when facing monetary penalties under a
federal statute.” 118 The Court denied certiorari on June 29,
2015, 119 signaling that the imposition of penalties on issuers will
remain contentious as the SEC tests the bounds of liability in
this market.
4. The SEC has invoked control person liability to bring
charges against a city official.
Consistent with its declared focus on individual liability as
“the most effective deterrent” of fraudulent disclosure, 120 the
SEC alleged in November 2014 that Gary Burtka, former mayor
of Allen Park, Michigan, “controlled” the city of Allen Park at
the time it issued $28 million in revenue bonds and that he was
therefore liable for the city’s fraudulent misrepresentations in
connection with those bonds. 121 The SEC based its theory of liaId at *3.
Id at *2.
116 See, for example, Anderson v Creighton, 483 US 635, 638 (1987) (observing that
“permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs”).
117 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Boudreaux v Securities and Exchange Commission, Docket No 14-1142, *1 (US filed Mar 17, 2015) (“Boudreaux Petition”).
118 Id at *i.
119 Boudreaux v Securities and Exchange Commission, 135 S Ct 2890, 2890 (2015).
120 Glazier, SEC’s Top Cop (cited in note 83).
121 Complaint, Securities and Exchange Commission v Burtka, Civil Action No 1414278, *2 (ED Mich filed Nov 6, 2014) (“Burtka Complaint”). See also generally Order
Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of
1933 and Section 21C of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order, In the Matter of City of Allen Park, Michigan, Securities Act of 1933 Release No 9677, SEC Administrative Proceeding No 3-16259 (Nov 6,
2014) (available on Westlaw at 2014 WL 5764984) (“Allen Park Order”).
114
115
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bility on § 20(a) of the Exchange Act, 122 which provides that
“[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person”
proved to be liable under the antifraud provisions “shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such
controlled person.” 123 Without addressing the SEC’s § 20(a) theory,
a judge for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan approved a settlement between the SEC and
Burtka in January 2015. 124 Under the terms of the settlement,
Burtka agreed both to permanently refrain from participating in
any municipal securities offerings and to pay a monetary penalty
of $10,000. 125 Although the settlement order is not clear on this
point, Burtka’s lifetime injunction from participating in municipal bond offerings will likely preclude him from serving in any
public role that relates to local economic development or financial planning. A fraud charge against a municipal official based
solely on § 20(a) is another first-of-its-kind SEC enforcement. 126
It is not clear how far this liability can or should extend in the
context of municipal government.
D. Framing the New Frontier
To emphasize an obvious point, this new, multifaceted enforcement regime pointedly targets the act of disclosure. There
is a practical reason for this: As discussed in Part I.B, the SEC’s
authority with respect to municipal issuers is limited to enforcing the antifraud provisions of the securities laws. 127 Policing
fraudulent disclosures is, therefore, as close as the SEC can
come to regulating issuers themselves. But while the SEC’s tools
may be limited, its policy objectives are broad. According to the
SEC’s description of its recent initiatives, the purpose of heightened enforcement is to demand greater accountability from local
officials by increasing the threat of liability. 128 The SEC reasons
See Burtka Complaint at *2 (cited in note 121).
15 USC § 78t(a).
124 Final Judgment as to Defendant Gary J. Burtka, Securities and Exchange Commission v Burtka, Civil Action No 14-14278, *3 (ED Mich filed Jan 28, 2015) (“Burtka
Final Judgment”).
125 Id at *2.
126 See SEC Charges Allen Park, Mich. and Two Former City Leaders (cited in note 103).
127 See text accompanying notes 60–62.
128 The SEC has repeatedly articulated this goal in public statements announcing
its recent enforcement efforts. For example, the current chief of the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement’s municipal securities unit recently remarked that the Division “won’t hesitate to use every legal avenue available to [the SEC] in order to hold [ ] officials accountable.” SEC Charges Allen Park, Mich. and Two Former City Leaders (cited in note 103).
122
123
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that this will deter issuer fraud, which will in turn “make our
municipal securities market fairer and more transparent” on
multiple fronts. 129
While most would agree that both greater government
transparency and market fairness are unobjectionable regulatory goals, it is worthwhile to pause and take a more disciplined
look at the means and the rhetoric that the SEC has employed
in pursuit of these goals. This Section contrasts the SEC’s rhetoric—which is pointedly focused on the need to protect individual
investors from issuer fraud—with the reality of financial distress that has recently plagued cities and towns across the country. A closer analysis reveals that there is a mismatch between
the goals that the SEC has articulated and the core problems
that many local governments and citizens currently face.
1. The SEC’s investor-protection rhetoric.
The SEC consistently cites the need to protect retail investors from disclosure fraud as the core justification for aggressive
enforcement action against government issuers and their officers. In a 2009 speech calling for greater regulatory oversight of
the municipal market, former SEC Commissioner Elisse Walter
argued that “[i]nvestors in municipal securities are . . . afforded
‘second-class treatment’ under current law.” 130 Commissioner
Luis Aguilar has reiterated the view that individual investors
have been significantly disadvantaged by a lack of market
transparency in his February 2015 speech on the SEC’s recent
efforts. 131 Furthermore, former SEC Chairman Levitt’s assertion
that retail investors in this market “need the SEC’s full protection” 132 echoes throughout the SEC’s 2012 Report on the Municipal Securities Market and more-recent SEC statements regard-

129 Aguilar, Statement on Making the Municipal Securities Market More Transparent (cited in note 50) (emphasizing that lack of transparency and other features of the
municipal securities market “place[ ] individual investors at a distinct disadvantage”).
130 Walter, Regulation of the Municipal Securities Market (cited in note 3).
131 Aguilar, Statement on Making the Municipal Securities Market More Transparent (cited in note 50).
132 Levitt, Muni Bonds Need Better Oversight (cited in note 2). See also Leslie Norwood,
With Renewed Focus, the Spotlight Shines on Municipal Bonds (SIFMA, Nov 26, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/E7AY-FAKZ (paraphrasing remarks by Ceresney, director of
the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, to the effect that “a lack of regulation can create substantial risk” in this market because “retail investors are the primary holders of these
securities”).

05 GUIDOTTI_CMT_SA (CAC) (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Seeking “the SEC’s Full Protection”

12/12/2015 2:36 PM

2067

ing enhanced enforcement efforts. 133 Academic discussion of the
flaws in the municipal securities market has further confirmed
that the existing regulatory regime is “investor-centric.” 134 The
SEC’s argument, of course, is that greater transparency regarding the financial health of municipal issuers will allow investors
to identify investments that match their risk preferences and to
“know what they own,” which will theoretically prevent investment losses due to information asymmetries. 135 In theory, this
rationale is straightforward and compelling, and it may be a
plausible justification for the SEC’s new enforcement approaches.
The SEC’s narrow rhetoric does not, however, address the
full scope of interests at stake in municipal disclosure. Strikingly
absent from the SEC’s published statements—including its
comprehensive 2012 report, which drives the current enforcement approach136—is a straightforward acknowledgement of the
core, underlying problem that stakeholders in this market face:
widespread and sometimes-catastrophic fiscal mismanagement
at the local level. 137 Only once in its 165-page Report on the
Municipal Securities Market does the SEC note that, in addition
to “provid[ing] investors with critical information” to guide investment decisions, robust financial disclosures by municipal issuers are “important to other stakeholders, such as . . . taxpay-

133 See, for example, SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market at *2 (cited in
note 1) (“The mission of the SEC is to protect investors—including investors in municipal
securities.”); Aguilar, Statement on Making the Municipal Securities Market More
Transparent (cited in note 50) (“The Commission can and must do better for individual
investors.”). The language of a 2008 press release announcing the creation of EMMA and
related rule changes also demonstrates the SEC’s pointed investor centrism: “[T]he disclosure and transparency of the municipal markets have never been more critical. Municipal securities investors need to know what they own.” SEC, MSRB: New Measures to
Provide More Transparency Than Ever Before for Municipal Bond Investors (SEC, Dec 9,
2008), archived at http://perma.cc/N4DH-E3QV.
134 Chung, 34 Cardozo L Rev at 1500 (cited in note 1) (arguing that “the governing
regulatory regime is investor-centric and default-centric in its approach to risk”).
135 SEC, MSRB: New Measures (cited in note 133) (explaining that the creation of
EMMA “will improve the flow of information in the municipal market and enable more
informed investors”).
136 See Glazier, Gaunt (cited in note 88) (citing the chief of the SEC’s municipal
securities–enforcement unit as saying that the unit’s enforcement priorities are driven
by the 2012 report).
137 There is no shortage of commentary on the recent surge in municipal bankruptcies and the broader insolvency problems that many cities have faced since the 2008
financial crisis. Most recently, Professor Michelle Wilde Anderson paints a sweeping and
insightful picture of the current state of municipal distress and the harm it imposes on
low-income residents. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities,
123 Yale L J 1118 (2014).
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ers.” 138 The SEC’s failure to fully and thoughtfully consider the
role of taxpayers in this unique market is problematic, because—as the following Section discusses—the functioning of
the municipal bond market can have deep impacts on the financial health of municipalities and the well-being of their residents.
2. The reality of local fiscal distress.
The development of the SEC’s new enforcement frontier coincides with an unprecedented surge in fiscal distress among
American municipalities. Between the years of 2008 and 2013,
twenty-eight cities filed bankruptcy or entered state receivership in response to fiscal insolvency. 139 Five of the six largest
municipal bankruptcies in American history have taken place in
the years since 2008. 140 An even greater number of municipalities face budget crises or are teetering on the edge of fiscal failure. 141 In several cases, state governments have appointed emergency managers to take control of failing cities’ finances and
implement stopgap measures against insolvency. 142 As Anderson
documents in her detailed study of “American cities that have
gone broke,” there is a widespread “austerity experiment” underway in distressed cities. 143 Local governments are “engaging
in slash-and-burn budgeting to address falling revenues, rising
expenses, and mounting debt.” 144 Crime rates have risen dramatically in localities that have been forced to cut police resources. 145
Funding for other categories of municipal services—including
maintenance of parks, street lighting, public libraries, education, and public transportation—has been reduced or eliminated
SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market at *69, 143 (cited in note 1).
Anderson, 123 Yale L J at 1120, 1130 (cited in note 137).
140 Id at 1120.
141 Anderson’s 2014 article is perhaps the most comprehensive academic account of
the recent dilemma of fiscal distress. Anderson, 123 Yale L J at 1124–25 (cited in note
137). For a more succinct overview of the financial challenges facing local governments
across the country, see generally Liz Gross, et al, The Local Squeeze: Falling Revenues
and Growing Demand for Services Challenge Cities, Counties, and School Districts (The
Pew Charitable Trusts, June 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/B3LH-DW7H (“Many
[cities, counties, and school districts] are in a fiscal vise, squeezed on one side by reduced
state aid and property tax income—which together make up more than half of local revenues—and growing demand for services on the other.”).
142 See The State Role in Local Government Financial Distress *7 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, July 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/2BDJ-E33M (analyzing recent instances of state intervention to prevent local insolvency).
143 Anderson, 123 Yale L J at 1129 (cited in note 137).
144 Id at 1120.
145 Id at 1160–63 (documenting a rise in crime rates in several failing cities).
138
139
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entirely. 146 In an increasing number of localities, Anderson has
observed, “[d]ecisionmakers must evaluate . . . whether a [failing] city could cut still more deeply into spending on current residents to pay off creditors, or whether it is creditors, rather than
residents, who have to bear the next round of cuts.” 147
The underlying causes of local fiscal distress are diverse.
The 2008 financial crisis strained all areas of the American
economy, but the associated spike in unemployment, decline in
the housing market, and rise in poverty rates hit local revenues
particularly hard. 148 More recently, unmanageable pension debt
has proved a problematic and controversial local liability. 149 In
many cases, poor financial planning and outright mismanagement by local officials have exacerbated the impact of these external pressures. 150
For example, the financial troubles currently facing the city
of Allen Park, Michigan—which plays a central role in this
Comment’s analysis—are the result of unsophisticated local decisionmaking and a disastrous misuse of the municipal securities market. The city hastily issued $28 million in revenue bonds
to finance the construction of a film studio that was supposed to
bring thousands of new jobs to the struggling city, but the plans
collapsed; the ensuing budget crisis prompted an emergency city
manager to impose a regime of fiscal austerity. 151 Residents
across the city consequently faced service reductions in many
areas of public life. 152 Allen Park’s story is troubling, but it is not
146 See id at 1164–67 (cataloguing budget cuts in several ailing urban municipalities); Gross, et al, The Local Squeeze at *13–17 (cited in note 141).
147 Anderson, 123 Yale L J at 1122 (cited in note 137).
148 See id at 1130, 1137. See also Robert Slavin, Why So Many Big Bankruptcies?
(Bond Buyer, Jan 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BX5C-XEYL (explaining that
even “[w]hen the broader economy started to pick up, recovery never came to these municipalities, leaving revenues depressed”).
149 See Anderson, 123 Yale L J at 1146–49 (cited in note 137) (identifying the recent
rise in unfunded-pension liabilities and their impact on local fiscal distress). The debate
surrounding the treatment of pension obligations in Detroit’s bankruptcy plan is a notable recent example. See, for example, Chris Christoff, Detroit Pension Cuts from Bankruptcy Prompt Cries of Betrayal (Bloomberg, Feb 4, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc
/JU7K-LY8N.
150 See Anderson, 123 Yale L J at 1150–51 (cited in note 137) (highlighting recent
instances of misguided local-development projects).
151 Allen Park Order at *5–6 (cited in note 121).
152 See, for example, Leverage Academy, Detroit Is Bankrupt, Allen Park, Michigan
Sends Layoff Notices to Entire Fire Department (Business Insider, Feb 24, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/J723-LRPK. Allen Park is among the twenty-eight cities that
Anderson studied as part of her investigation into what she terms the local “austerity
experiment.” Anderson, 123 Yale L J at 1129–32, 1224–27 (cited in note 137). For further
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anomalous. Indeed, the problems of local governance—weak
oversight, lack of sophistication, and agency problems, to name a
few—are deeply intertwined with the nationwide dilemma of fiscal distress. 153
***
This Comment serves in part to contextualize the SEC’s new
enforcement frontier within this broader national dilemma.
Consistent with its mandate to “protect investors” and “maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets,” 154 the SEC has focused
myopically on the structure of the municipal securities market
and the role of investors within it. But the SEC does not act in a
vacuum: the monetary penalties and backdoor disclosure requirements that the SEC has aggressively pursued will have
deep and lasting impacts on cities facing financial hardship. Indeed, many of the cities that have been the subjects of the SEC’s
most novel theories of liability are already facing severe financial stress. 155
Moreover, financial disclosure in the bond market is not as
isolated an issue as it might seem. In several of the SEC’s recent
enforcement cases, the disclosure failures at issue have
stemmed from flawed governance structures, unsophisticated
decisionmaking, and attempts by local officials to conceal deeper
systemic financial issues facing the cities. The SEC’s suit
detail on Allen Park’s financial troubles and the resulting reduction in citywide services,
see Part II.B.
153 This Comment does not examine theories of local governance in great depth, but
there is no shortage of scholarly discussion on this important aspect of public finance.
Professors Clayton P. Gillette and Richard C. Schragger, for instance, have written extensively on the design of local institutions and the governance problems that contribute
to financial instability. Their work informs some of this Comment’s analysis and is a
valuable starting point for further inquiry. See, for example, Clayton P. Gillette, Can
Municipal Political Structure Improve Fiscal Performance?, 33 Rev Bank & Fin L 571,
572 (2014) (arguing that “immediate sources of municipal fiscal distress” are “attributable to problems of institutional design, problems that fail to discourage local officials
from pursuing self-interested objectives that deviate from policies that would enhance
the fiscal health of the localities that they govern”); Richard C. Schragger, Democracy
and Debt, 121 Yale L J 860, 863 (2012) (disputing the prevailing notion that “profligacy
is [the] central problem” of failing municipalities and that externally imposed discipline
on local officials is the solution). See also generally Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and
Financially Stressed Municipalities, 39 Fordham Urban L J 639 (2012); Schragger, 39
Fordham Urban L J 787 (cited in note 18).
154 The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation (SEC, June 10, 2013), archived at
http://perma.cc/7SJ5-X6CT.
155 See, for example, Part II.B.
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against Boudreaux, former Miami budget director, is a useful
example: Under the loose supervision of other local decisionmakers, Boudreaux executed several questionable capital
transfers to cover shortfalls in the city’s general budget. 156 He
then allegedly concealed the transfers from local investors and
Miami residents by making glaring misrepresentations in various public documents relating to the city’s finances. 157
Government opacity and fiscal distress have appeared in
equal measure at the state level, as well. The SEC’s action
against Illinois, for example, centered on the state’s failure to
disclose to bond investors the magnitude of its unfunded-pension
liability 158—one of the many financial pressures that continues
to plague the state. 159 Highlighting the linkages between opacity,
fiscal distress, and problems of local governance, the SEC noted
in its cease and desist order against the state that the misleading disclosures “resulted from, among other things, various institutional failures,” including the failure to “train personnel involved in the disclosure process adequately.” 160 A similar story
can be told about Allen Park, Michigan, where city officials’ decision to incur $28 million of debt despite the disintegration of
their planned development project bespoke severely flawed financial planning, if not outright incompetence.
In many ways, these cases are not solely about the lies that
issuers tell; they also signal that opacity in local government decisionmaking can be a symptom of poor local governance, which
itself contributes to local fiscal hardship. Whether or not the
SEC acknowledges it, the new frontier in municipal securities
enforcement is as much about imposing discipline on poorly
managed local governments as it is about policing fraud. And
every effort that the SEC makes to penalize mismanagement
will impose some form of social or monetary cost on local governments and the residents who rely on them for basic services.
Any analysis of the SEC’s new frontier must, therefore, pay
156 See Securities and Exchange Commission v City of Miami, 988 F Supp 2d 1343,
1346–51 (SD Fla 2013).
157 See id.
158 See Illinois Order at *5–8 (cited in note 93).
159 See, for example, Richard Dye, Nancy Hudspeth, and Andrew Crosby, Apocalypse
Now? The Consequences of Pay-Later Budgeting in Illinois: Updated Projections from
IGPA’s Fiscal Futures Model *1, 4 (The Fiscal Futures Project, Jan 19, 2015), archived at
http://perma.cc/KJA5-DKL7 (noting that Illinois’s current fiscal crisis is rooted in the
state’s “long-established practice of pay-later budgeting”) (emphasis omitted).
160 Illinois Order at *8 (cited in note 93).
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careful attention to the ways in which the SEC’s activity impacts
and interacts with the broader dilemma of local fiscal distress.
To that end, the following Parts investigate how the SEC’s
investor-protection rhetoric and common intuitions about the
virtues of transparency are likely to be experienced on the
ground by two key stakeholder groups: bondholders and taxpayers. 161 Parts II and III identify some of the more troubling practical and doctrinal implications of the SEC’s new enforcement
regime and provide a rubric for further scrutiny of the SEC’s
changing role in this market. The Conclusion explains that,
while sunlight may theoretically be the best disinfectant, the
SEC’s doctrine-bending theories of municipal liability, expressed
through an aggressive punitive enforcement regime, will be relatively ineffective in achieving healthier communication between
local governments and their various stakeholders. Indeed, there
is good reason to believe that these theories could cause harm to
already-ailing local communities without meaningfully improving municipal governance. The problem of local fiscal mismanagement is in need of a solution, but the SEC’s current attempts
may well cause more harm than they remedy.
II. THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF A DISCLOSURE-FORCING REGIME
The first step in critiquing the SEC’s new enforcement frontier is to consider whether the penalties it imposes are likely to
achieve their intended aim—that is, to protect “disadvantaged”
investors by enhancing market transparency. 162 It is natural to
assume, as the SEC does, that poor disclosure practices in a securities market harm investors by obscuring the true risk of investment. 163 But as this Part demonstrates, the unique nature of
municipal bonds makes it more likely that taxpayers, rather
than bondholders, lose when local projects fail—regardless of
161 Most often, there is no significant overlap between bondholders and taxpayers in
a given municipality, and the academic literature treats these groups as conceptually
distinct. See, for example, Schragger, 39 Fordham Urban L J at 797 (cited in note 18);
Gillette, 39 Fordham Urban L J at 641 (cited in note 153) (describing the “competing
claims by bondholders and residents”). This Comment does the same, and Part II.A further examines the distinction between the two groups.
162 As discussed in Part I.D.1, the SEC has repeatedly emphasized that the aim of
its various ongoing initiatives, including its increased enforcement activity, is to
“make our municipal securities market fairer and more transparent” in the interest of
“disadvantage[d]” individual investors. Aguilar, Statement on Making the Municipal Securities Market More Transparent (cited in note 50).
163 See Part I.D.1.
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whether disclosures were accurate or robust. As a result, punitive enforcement mechanisms are likely to impose short- and
long-term costs on cities without providing clear offsetting benefits to investors.
Part II.A describes precisely what is at stake for bondholders and taxpayers when issuers borrow. It establishes that,
while bondholders have legal and economic means of quantifying
and securing their investments, “[r]esidents, by contrast, have
no such legal instruments with which to monetize their share of
a city’s revenues.” 164 This results in an inherent imbalance of
risks between these stakeholder groups. Part II.B examines how
instances of issuer fraud can further exacerbate this imbalance.
Part II.C argues that the burdens of SEC enforcement impose
significant and potentially far-reaching social costs on localities
already facing financial stress without providing offsetting benefits. Finally, Part II.D posits that investors may not be willing to
bear an increase in the cost of municipal securities as a result of
more-burdensome regulatory oversight. A chilling of investor interest in municipal bonds could limit local governments’ access
to capital in undesirable ways. The policy arguments set forth in
this Part are not exhaustive, but they are a starting point for a
critical analysis of the SEC’s new frontier. More importantly,
they serve as a guide to any future judicial analysis of the
emerging legal questions that are outlined in Part III.
A. The Difference between Taxpayers and Bondholders
Central to this Comment’s analysis of the SEC’s new enforcement activity is a clear understanding of the inherent tensions that exist between the primary stakeholder groups implicated in public borrowing: local citizens, whose tax money and
services are on the line when their governments borrow, and
bondholders, whose investments’ integrity hinges on the success
of local government operations and projects. 165 There are certainly

Anderson, 123 Yale L J at 1122 (cited in note 137).
This Comment uses the terms “taxpayers,” “residents,” and “citizens” interchangeably, as does the academic literature. See generally, for example, Anderson, 123
Yale L J 1118 (cited in note 137). The terms collectively and simultaneously refer to the
individual subgroups of the American population that rely on the institutions of local
governance to organize civic life. Indeed, the terms are valuable in highlighting the distinct vectors on which these subgroups engage with local government. Taxpayers are a
city’s primary source of revenue and thus have a direct financial stake in local fiscal
management. Residents entrust local officials to provide fundamental services and en164
165
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ways in which the interests of taxpayers and bondholders align.
Both groups have meaningful incentives to monitor local financial decisionmaking, and both are invested to varying degrees in
the municipalities’ successful operation. As discussed in Part
I.D.2, residents often suffer when their representatives fail to
manage local finances effectively, giving residents good reasons
to monitor and discipline poor decisionmaking through the political process. Bondholders may be less concerned with the ongoing vitality of the local governments whose bonds they hold, but
they do have an interest in protecting their investments and are
thus incentivized to detect and deter local misconduct. 166 In the
abstract, then, residents and bondholders have a joint interest
in promoting better local governance. But in times of distress,
competing claims to dwindling local resources complicate the relationship between citizens and bondholders, making the two
parties distinct in ways that are important to any analysis of local governance. 167
The most striking difference between the two groups lies
in the relative flexibility of their investments in municipal operations. To put it simply, bondholders have greater choice in
and greater control over the investments they make, while citizens—especially those with low incomes—are in many ways
anchored to the cities and towns in which they live. 168 There is a
significant body of literature on the question of citizen mobility
as an expression of preference; the classic theory is that, in a
world free of transaction costs, any given citizen can make an informed choice about which municipality to “invest” in and is free
sure basic public safety in exchange for tax dollars. And citizens mediate this exchange
by participating in local political processes.
166 The question whether local residents or bondholders are superior monitors of local decisionmaking is complex and interesting. Professors Gillette and Schragger have
both considered the issue in depth. See Gillette, 39 Fordham Urban L J at 657 (cited in
note 153) (arguing that “[a]ssigning priority to residents in the event of fiscal distress [ ]
would induce bondholders to ensure that [third parties] involved in the bond issuance
process would exploit their monitoring capacity to avoid bondholder losses”); Schragger,
39 Fordham Urban L J at 788 (cited in note 18) (“Gillette’s article has convinced me that
neither bondholders nor citizens are particularly good monitors of local fiscal probity.”).
167 See, for example, Gillette, 39 Fordham Urban L J at 641 (cited in note 153) (describing “a contest that threatens to become all too familiar as the current fiscal crisis
continues to engulf municipal budgets: the effort to resolve competing claims by bondholders and residents to a limited municipal treasury”); Schragger, 39 Fordham Urban L
J at 788, 797 (cited in note 18) (considering the implications of legal rules that favor
bondholders over citizens when local governments face fiscal stress).
168 Gillette, 39 Fordham Urban L J at 658 & n 104 (cited in note 153) (explaining
that “even relatively mobile residents cannot exit costlessly”).
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to exit her investment by relocating to a different taxing jurisdiction whenever local officials fail to satisfy her preferences.169
But outside such a “highly stylized world,” 170 practical constraints on mobility—including discovery costs, expenses of relocation, geographic preferences, and employment opportunities—
often prevent taxpayers from freely entering and exiting municipalities. At the same time, the realities of local politics, such as
the divergent sizes and organizational skills of various unaligned local interest groups, can diminish the effectiveness of the
traditional voting process in reflecting individual preferences.171
The reality of immobility is even starker for low-income residents, who typically have no realistic exit options and therefore
often bear the brunt of their cities’ fiscal distress. 172
Bondholders, on the other hand, are likely to be less socioeconomically diverse, are better able to manage the risks of default by diversifying their investments, and face greater choice
and more exit options when making investments in local government. To start with, investors have thousands of distinct
bond issuances to choose from and can engage in substantial ex
ante information gathering—with the help of credit rating agencies 173—as they make investment choices. Investors are also
empowered to mitigate the risk of default (however minimal) on
a single bond by including it within a diversified portfolio of in-

See, for example, Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J
Polit Econ 416, 419–20 (1956) (“Consumer-voters are fully mobile and will move to that
community where their preference patterns, which are set, are best satisfied.”). See also,
for example, Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of Financially
Failed Cities, 114 Colum L Rev 1373, 1402 (2014) (“[I]n the idealized Tieboutian world of
perfect mobility, the threat of exit would fully constrain local officials from offering bundles of goods and services or tax prices inconsistent with residents’ preferences.”).
170 Gillette, 114 Colum L Rev at 1402–05 (cited in note 169).
171 See id.
172 See Anderson, 123 Yale L J at 1198–99 & n 312 (cited in note 137).
173 Credit rating agencies are not immune to the information asymmetries that poor
issuer disclosure practices can create, but they are nonetheless a useful and important
tool available to bondholders in making investment decisions. See Annette Thau, The
Bond Book 42 (McGraw-Hill 3d ed 2011) (noting that, despite “criticism” and “skepticism” of credit ratings after the 2008 financial crisis, “no viable alternative has taken
[their] place” and that “[m]any, if not most, investors, continue to rely on [credit] ratings
to evaluate the credit quality of bonds”); Fischer, Investing in Municipal Bonds at 7–10
(cited in note 13) (advising uninformed investors to buy rated bonds and pointing out
that municipal bonds have historically had more-dependable ratings than taxable
bonds).
169
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vestments with differing risk-return profiles. 174 The local citizen
can live in only one locality at a time, making her highly sensitive to the risks of municipal distress: when fiscal woes arise,
she either endures the associated service cuts and tax increases
or she pursues a costly relocation. The municipal investor, on
the other hand, can hold a stake in a number of localities—as
well as in corporate entities, foreign sovereigns, and the US government—at any given moment. In a well-diversified portfolio,
the costs of fiscal distress in any given locality are offset by
gains that are generated by the other assets the investor holds.
Investors can thus manage municipal risk with greater precision
and foresight than the average citizen. And, as noted above, the
low-income citizen—who relies more heavily on local services
but is generally less mobile—is even less capable than the average citizen of hedging against the risk of local financial failures.
It is useful to note that individual municipal investors are
also more likely to be wealthy than the average citizen, as the
federal tax savings associated with municipal bonds are most
beneficial to those who fall within higher federal tax brackets.
That is, an investor who faces a high marginal tax rate may
achieve a higher net yield from tax-exempt municipal bonds
than from taxable bonds (or from other securities that do not
carry tax advantages), despite the fact that tax-exempt municipal bonds generally offer lower interest rates than their taxable
counterparts. 175 As a general principle, investors structure their
174 See Gillette, 39 Fordham Urban L J at 665 (cited in note 153). See also Fischer,
Investing in Municipal Bonds at 205–18 (cited in note 13) (explaining methods by which
to diversify one’s portfolio in order to minimize risk).
175 The ratio used to compare prospective returns on tax-exempt versus taxable
bonds is R = (rt − re) / rt, in which R is the yield advantage of taxable bonds compared to
municipal bonds, rt is the yield on the taxable bond, and re is the yield on the tax-exempt
bond. As long as R exceeds a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate, the municipal bond will have
a higher after-tax yield, whereas if R is below the marginal tax rate, the opposite is true.
For example: If an investor’s marginal tax rate is 33 percent and she has the option to
invest in a tax-exempt bond with a 5 percent yield, she will benefit from switching her
investment to a taxable bond only if that bond offers a minimum interest rate of 7.46
percent. An investor with a marginal tax rate of 15 percent, on the other hand, would
switch to any taxable instrument that offers a yield greater than 5.88 percent. This simplified scenario demonstrates that, because of the tax exemption, higher-income individuals will prefer tax-exempt bonds to taxable bonds more frequently than lower-income
individuals will, even though interest rates on tax-exempt bonds are lower. See Harvey
Galper, et al, Who Benefits from Tax-Exempt Bonds? An Application of the Theory of Tax
Incidence, 35 Mun Fin J 53, 58 (2014). For a straightforward description of the investment choice between tax-exempt bonds and taxable bonds, see Jason Van Bergen, Weighing the Tax Benefits of Municipal Securities (Investopedia), archived at
http://perma.cc/JXX7-L7DR.
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portfolios to achieve the highest after-tax rates of return; as a
result, the existence of the tax exemption induces higher-income
taxpayers to shift their holdings away from taxable securities
and toward municipal debt. 176 In theory, high earners thus hold
a greater proportion of municipal debt. 177
The empirical literature reflects these theoretical principles.
A 2014 study published in the Municipal Finance Journal employed a new methodology to demonstrate that the tax exemption on municipal bonds “provides a disproportionate benefit to
high-income taxpayers,” 178 and an older but more comprehensive
study of federal income tax returns found that more than threequarters of tax-exempt bonds held by households were held by
individuals with marginal income tax rates of 28 percent or
higher. 179 This figure is significant given the makeup of the
municipal bond–investor pool: as recently as 2011, individual
households held 37 percent of all outstanding municipal debt in
the United States, while mutual funds and money market
funds—common investment mechanisms for individuals—held
another 18 and 11 percent of the market, respectively. 180 Indeed,
politicians on both sides of the aisle have criticized the tax exemption of municipal bonds as “a subsidy for the rich.” 181 This
characterization is controversial, but it illustrates the straight176 See Galper, et al, 35 Mun Fin J at 61–62 (cited in note 175). See also James M.
Poterba and Arturo Ramírez Verdugo, Portfolio Substitution and the Revenue Cost of the
Federal Income Tax Exemption for State and Local Government Bonds, 64 Natl Tax J
591, 596 (2011) (noting that “investors tend to invest in the asset classes for which they
have a comparative tax advantage” and that, if the tax exemption were eliminated,
“there would be a substantial shift in the set of investors with a comparative tax advantage for holding these bonds”). As an additional empirical example of portfolio shifting in the municipal market, a 1994 study found that taxpayers in higher-income categories decreased their holdings of tax-exempt bonds from 1983 to 1989, a period during
which the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced marginal tax rates for high earners. See generally John Karl Scholz, Tax Progressivity and Household Portfolios: Descriptive Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, in Joel Slemrod, ed, Tax Progressivity and
Income Inequality 219 (Cambridge 1994).
177 Galper, et al, 35 Mun Fin J at 66–67 (cited in note 175).
178 Id at 66. See also Galper, et al, 67 Natl Tax J at 901–02, 922 (cited in note 15)
(expanding on the previous study and concluding that, although higher-income households receive most of the benefit of the tax exemption on municipal bonds, “tax-exempt
municipal debt is also shown to [ ] benefit low-income households with children by reducing the cost of public education”).
179 Daniel R. Feenberg and James M. Poterba, Which Households Own Municipal
Bonds? Evidence from Tax Returns, 44 Natl Tax J 93, 93 (1991).
180 Tracy Gordon, Buy and Hold (On Tight): The Recent Muni Bond Rollercoaster
and What It Means for Cities *3 (Brookings Institution, Sept 19, 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/44BP-2KJ8.
181 Aikman, et al, 33 Mun Fin J at 16 (cited in note 15).
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forward fact that the individual investors whom the SEC’s new
frontier aims to protect are likely to have higher incomes than
the average American taxpayer. Such investors may be better
positioned than local citizens to manage their investment risks
and to weather fiscal declines in the local governments in which
they hold a stake.
It is also useful to identify the various mechanisms that investors may rely on to hedge against risk in municipal investments and to protect against the effects of default. First and
foremost, a bond investment creates a contractual obligation:
The terms of the instrument—including maturity date, coupon
rate, and purpose of the funds to be raised—are set out in an indenture or other formal offering statement that provides each
bondholder with a contractual remedy in the event that the issuer fails to meet its obligations. 182 The indenture identifies
which of the issuer’s acts or omissions will constitute a default
on the bond and what remedies will flow from an uncured event
of default. 183 Moreover, bondholders are not individually responsible for policing the issuer’s performance; the indenture typically
appoints a trustee to safeguard investors’ interests and act on
their behalf if legal action is required. 184 Thus, a bondholder’s
first line of defense against a loss is the contract by which his
bond is governed. Purchasers can also seek out bonds that are
priced to provide additional safeguards against default, like
bond insurance. 185
Risks of loss are also constrained in the event of municipal
insolvency or Chapter 9 bankruptcy, in which immediate contractual remedies may be unavailable. 186 Revenue bonds, which
are secured by specific anticipated revenue streams, are considered to be among the safer municipal investments: they are given priority over unsecured general obligation bonds and thereSee Zipf, How Municipal Bonds Work at 1–25, 47–48 (cited in note 26).
See id at 3–4.
184 See id at 3.
185 Municipal bond insurers were deeply impacted by the financial crisis, such that
insured bonds are no longer the norm in the municipal market, but investors still have
the option to seek out bonds with this and other protective mechanisms. See Thau, The
Bond Book at 136–42 (cited in note 173).
186 The filing of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition triggers the automatic stay provision of § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 USC § 901(a). The automatic stay halts all litigation and debt-collection activities against the municipality (including contractual
claims by creditors), thereby giving the municipality an opportunity to develop a thorough
restructuring plan. See James A. Coniglio and M. David Gelfand, 2 State & Local Government Debt Financing § 14:13 (Thomson Reuters 2d ed 2014).
182
183
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fore are paid ahead of those bonds in a municipal bankruptcy.187
The priority of general obligation bonds in Chapter 9 bankruptcy
is somewhat uncertain and often depends on state law. 188 But
Chapter 9 bankruptcy is still fairly rare, especially in light of the
possibility of state bailouts and emergency receiverships that
help struggling cities weather financial downturns. 189 Indeed, in
a few high-profile instances, bondholders have “survived [municipal] bankruptcy relatively unscathed.” 190
Investor losses are even less frequent outside the rare event
of bankruptcy. Schragger recently noted the irony in his observation that “[d]uring the present economic crisis, . . . the rhetoric
(if not practice) of bondholder inviolability seems . . . robust,”
while rates of municipal default have remained markedly low. 191
In fact, recent reports indicate that the rate of municipal defaults has steadily declined over 2013 and 2014. According to a
December 2014 study, 57 issuers defaulted for the first time in
2014, as compared to 69 defaults in 2013 and 140 in 2010. 192
These numbers are striking when viewed in light of the SEC’s estimate that, in 2012, there were approximately forty-four thousand distinct municipal issuers with outstanding debt. 193 Of those
fifty-seven recent defaulters, most were government agencies and
sublocal districts, as opposed to state or municipal governments,
and 82 percent were unrated. 194
See Fischer, Investing in Municipal Bonds at 15 (cited in note 13).
See General Obligation Bonds: State Law, Bankruptcy and Disclosure Considerations *i (National Association of Bond Lawyers, Aug 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/5242-HKLL.
189 See id at *13. See also generally Gillette, 114 Colum L Rev 1373 (cited in note
169) (arguing for takeover boards as a useful alternative option available for struggling
cities).
190 Chung, 34 Cardozo L Rev at 1496 & n 203 (cited in note 1) (discussing Vallejo,
California, and a school district in San Jose, California, both of which paid bondholders
“in full and on time” despite seeking municipal-bankruptcy protection).
191 Schragger, 39 Fordham Urban L J at 797 (cited in note 18). See also Larry G.
Locke and Virginia R. Locke, Who’s Afraid of Municipal Defaults?, 5 Intl J Bus, Accounting & Fin 129, 134–35 (2011) (explaining that bondholders’ confidence in municipal debt
in the face of local fiscal distress stems from the historical rarity of municipal default
and the probability of intervention by the state government to prevent it).
192 See Romy Varghese, Municipal Defaulters Decline amid Improving Economy:
Muni Credit (Bloomberg, Dec 31, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/TM6Y-RBMA.
193 SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities Market at *1 (cited in note 1). Precise
calculations regarding the current number of municipal issuers with outstanding debt
appear to be unavailable.
194 See Varghese, Municipal Defaulters Decline (cited in note 192). Note that rating
agencies such as Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s provide municipal credit ratings for
many, but not all, municipal-debt issuances. Such ratings take into account the relative
187
188
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One straightforward explanation for the dearth of defaults
is the ability of municipal entities to simply raise taxes or receive state bailouts to cover shortfalls. 195 Even in cases of financial distress, cities may be more willing to cut services or raise
taxes than to default on municipal bonds. Like any borrower,
municipal issuers fear that default could increase borrowing
costs or jeopardize their (or surrounding municipalities’) access
to credit markets altogether. 196 Schragger additionally posits
that the preference to not default may be explained by political
“hostility to redistributional spending”—for many municipalities, “[i]t may be that repaying bonds that primarily pay for local
infrastructure is more palatable than keeping the municipality’s
pension commitments or providing social services.” 197 Once
again, defining the distinction between citizens and bondholders
is paramount to understanding the asymmetrical allocation of
benefits and risks in this market.
B. Who Loses When Issuers Lie?
In the municipal bond market as it currently stands, the average individual investor is far better positioned than the average local citizen to make careful investment selections that balance her unique preferences for risk and return. But what
happens to the best-laid municipal investment plans when issuers commit fraud? The question is crucial to investigating the
SEC’s new frontier. The answer is that very little happens. Two
recent, representative case studies help illuminate this point.
In late 2009 and 2010, the city of Allen Park, Michigan, issued over $30 million in so-called double-barreled general obligation bonds. The bonds specified that principal and interest
would be paid out of revenues generated from the project being
financed, but they also included a pledge of the municipality’s
full faith and credit—that is, a commitment by Allen Park to
draw on local tax revenues—if the designated project failed to

default risk of a given issuer. See Municipal Bond Credit Report: Third Quarter 2014
*13–15 (SIFMA, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/7QZZ-5N9B.
195 For a thorough overview of the role that states have (or have not) played in aiding local governments in distress, see generally The State Role (cited in note 142). See
also Locke and Locke, 5 Intl J Bus, Accounting & Fin at 134–35 (cited in note 191) (“[A]s
local governments have experienced the occasional default or near default, state governments have imposed legal regimes upon them to increase their economic stability.”).
196 See Schragger, 39 Fordham Urban L J at 799 (cited in note 18).
197 Id at 801.
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yield sufficient income to meet ongoing debt obligations. 198 In
Allen Park, the designated project was the construction of a movie
studio by a California-based film and production company. 199 The
city formed a public-private partnership with both the production company and a third-party developer, and the city pledged
to use proceeds from the bond issuance to buy land that it would
then donate to the partnership for development. 200 The partnership collapsed, however, when the city was advised by bond
counsel that it was not permitted to donate assets purchased
with bond proceeds to the partnership. 201 Once it became clear
that the city was unable to make the requisite contribution, the
developer walked away—along with the $20 million it had
pledged to finance the project’s first phase—and the production
company significantly reduced its commitment. 202 The city nonetheless proceeded to issue over $28 million in double-barreled
bonds in late 2009 and another $2.7 million in 2010, all the while
keeping silent about the deteriorating prospects of the project. 203
The failure to disclose the status of the project in its bondoffering documents was the subject of a 2014 cease and desist
proceeding against the city for violations of each of the federal
antifraud provisions. 204 As discussed in Part I.C.4, the SEC also
charged the city’s mayor, Burtka, alleging derivative control
person liability under § 20(a) of the Exchange Act. A district
judge in the Eastern District of Michigan approved a settlement
between the SEC and Burtka in January 2015; in it, Burtka
agreed to permanently refrain from participating in any municipal
securities offerings and to pay a penalty of $10,000 to the SEC.205
The failed project, compounded with other financial pressures
and a budget deficit, thrust the city into financial distress.206
Michigan state officials appointed an emergency manager in October 2012, who implemented various budgetary cutbacks to ac-

198 See Allen Park Order at *2 (cited in note 121). See also Part I.A (discussing the
nature of the full faith and credit pledge with respect to general obligation bonds);
Fippinger, The Securities Law of Public Finance at § 1:6.1 (cited in note 17) (same).
199 Allen Park Order at *2 (cited in note 121).
200 Id.
201 Id at *3.
202 Id.
203 Allen Park Order at *2 (cited in note 121).
204 Id at *7.
205 See generally Burtka Final Judgment (cited in note 124).
206 See Allen Park Order at *5–6 (cited in note 121).
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commodate the city’s debt obligations. 207 In fact, instead of immediately defaulting on its debts, the city made a 10 percent reduction in pay to active employees, eliminated vacant positions,
consolidated health-care plans, and increased co-pays and deductibles for city employees. 208
The SEC’s cease and desist action imposed an additional
monetary and administrative burden on the city. As a condition
of the order, the city agreed to implement remedial measures
designed to improve the city’s disclosure procedures. Under the
order, the city must: (1) adopt written policies and procedures, to
be drafted by disclosure counsel, to facilitate the city’s compliance with federal securities laws; (2) designate an individual to
“certify, upon consultation with disclosure counsel, that the offering documents do not contain any untrue statements of material fact” for any new bond issuances in the next two years; and
(3) retain disclosure counsel to train “all personnel involved in
the City’s bond offering and disclosure process.” 209 The SEC will
play an ongoing monitoring role: the city must provide the SEC
with copies of its policies and procedures as well as with certifications that the relevant personnel have been adequately
trained. 210 The procedural, training, and reporting requirements
seem to apply even if the city refrains from issuing bonds in the
foreseeable future.
While citizens suffer service cuts and emergency management, where do the bondholders stand? To start with, the most
recent Allen Park budget contemplates debt service through
2016, signaling no intent to default on the fraudulently issued
bonds. 211 Further confirming the commitment not to default, local media outlets have reported that the city is in the process of
207 See Corey Williams, Allen Park Latest Michigan City to Get Emergency Manager
(Crain’s Detroit Business, Oct 26, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/K5VG-DRPE; Gov.
Rick Snyder: Allen Park Financial Emergency Resolved (State of Michigan, Sept 25,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9FJ6-XBSJ. See also City of Allen Park, City of Allen
Park: Fiscal Years 2014-2015 & 2015-2016 Adopted Budget *3 (May 13, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/J7ST-5RDC (“Allen Park Budget”) (explaining that the adopted 2015
and 2016 budgets “include[ ] a subsidy made by the General Fund in order to cover the
debt service payment totaling $1,200,000” on the “Southfield Lease Properties,” the land
that was purchased for the failed studio project). The city successfully sold the land for
$12 million in August 2014. Jenny Kalish, Allen Park City Council to Discuss Restructuring Bond Debt from Failed Movie Studio at Closed Meeting Thursday (The News-Herald,
Nov 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8JJD-JQDL.
208 See Gov. Rick Snyder (cited in note 207).
209 Allen Park Order at *6 (cited in note 121).
210 Id.
211 See Allen Park Budget at *3 (cited in note 207).
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restructuring its debt through a redemption feature built into
the terms of the underlying bond contracts: The city reportedly
plans to exercise a call option to repurchase the 2009 and 2010
issuances, thereby paying off the bonds’ principals in full ahead
of their maturity dates and relieving itself of the relatively high
interest payments due over the maturity of the bonds. 212 The city
also purportedly plans to simultaneously issue a new series of
debt at a lower interest rate; this will finance the call and reduce
the city’s future interest payments. 213 The details of the refinancing plan are currently unclear, but the effect of a call option is
straightforward: bondholders get their money back in full (and
possibly at a premium, if the indenture so provides). 214 They can
then reinvest it however they would like. Moreover, because the
call option was an element of the bond contract, it is an eventuality for which bondholders bargained when they made their initial investments—no investor in the 2009 and 2010 Allen Park
bonds can fairly be surprised by this early redemption or by the
loss of future interest payments from this particular issuer.
It should be noted that it is possible, though unlikely, that
some holders of the 2009 and 2010 Allen Park bonds suffered a
financial loss in the secondary market as a result of the fraud.
Theoretically, revelation of the failure of a project designed to finance principal and interest payments, compounded with revelation of the issuer’s misstatements about that project, could have
depressed the prices of those bonds if they were being traded in
the secondary market. If a hypothetical purchaser of those bonds
at their primary issuance sought to sell in the secondary market
after these revelations came to light (but before news of the refinancing was reported), she might end up selling at a loss.
It is unclear, however, if this is how the market would respond in practice. As Part II.A discusses, the various mechanisms currently in place to protect bondholders against actual
default—including cities’ general unwillingness to default in the
first place—may make secondary investors relatively unresponsive to news of local financial mismanagement or even fraud.
This may be especially true when the bond is backed, as were
the Allen Park bonds, with the issuer’s pledge to draw on tax
revenues in order to meet principal and interest payments. Ad212 See Caitlin Devitt, Allen Park, Mich., to Refinance Bonds Targeted by SEC (Bond
Buyer, Nov 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4A9Y-FZHK.
213 Id.
214 See Zipf, How Municipal Bonds Work at 33–40 (cited in note 26).
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ditionally, the predominance in this market of buy-and-hold activity as opposed to robust secondary trading decreases the likelihood that the individual investors that the SEC aims to protect
have suffered from their investments in the Allen Park movie
studio.
Note, too, that even if some subset of Allen Park bondholders has suffered cognizable losses as a direct result of the city’s
misstatements, private recovery is available under § 10(b) of the
Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, as well as under applicable state
securities laws. 215 While opacity of the secondary trading market
makes it hard to test the theory that Allen Park investors as a
whole have emerged from the fraud unscathed, the fact that no
contractual or fraud claims appear to have been brought in state
or federal court on behalf of Allen Park investors bolsters the
theory that losses, if any, have been minimal.
A second case study suggests that, in some instances, mandated disclosure is unnecessary because material information is
readily available to investors through other publicly available
channels. In its settlement with the state of Kansas in 2014, the
SEC alleged that offering documents associated with eight of
Kansas’s recent bond offerings failed to disclose the risky underfunding of the state’s pension program. 216 But in almost the
same breath, the SEC noted that, “[f]rom 2004 on, the underfunding . . . was repeatedly discussed in various local newspapers, and by credit rating agencies.” 217 It is hard to credibly argue that investors in Kansas bonds were harmed by scanty
bond-offering documents when robust and decision-critical information was already publicly available through popular media and
bond rating materials.218 It is true that the SEC has elsewhere
held that “[p]ublication of a few articles in local newspapers
with limited circulation” is not sufficiently “available” to na-

215 See Part I.B.2. See also Sonnenfeld v City and County of Denver, 100 F3d 744,
745, 747 (10th Cir 1996) (establishing that there is an implied private right of action
against municipal issuers under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
216 The Kansas Order notes that the significant underfunding of the pension program created a “risk of non-appropriation of debt service payments by the State Legislature.” Kansas Order at *2, 4 (cited in note 93). Such a nonappropriation would have been
tantamount to a default and would accordingly have made the Kansas bonds riskier for
individual investors.
217 Id at *4.
218 Indeed, the SEC acknowledged in the 2012 report that retail investors tend to
rely on credit ratings more readily than institutional investors do. SEC, Report on the
Municipal Securities Market at *53 & n 302 (cited in note 1).
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tionwide investors to inform their investment decisions. 219 But
there is little doubt that investors in local governments have adequate notice that local media are likely to be the best sources of
current information on city operations. Practically speaking, impaired disclosure does not necessarily lead to investor losses in
this unique market, in which the media and communication
from public officials have the capacity to fill the informational
gap that investors often face in the corporate market.
As the Allen Park and Kansas settlements demonstrate, the
SEC’s current investor-protection rhetoric rings hollow. Whether
issuers disclose freely or incompletely, and whether they are
honest or they instead shield the truth of their financial conditions, bondholders are largely indifferent because, quite simply,
they rarely lose. Even in the face of fiscal mismanagement, the
security of municipal bond investments seems to come at the expense of local citizens—especially the less mobile and less savvy
among them.
C. Who Pays When the SEC Settles?
One principal argument in favor of the SEC’s newly aggressive punitive regime is that it resolves what might be called a
problem of recurring misses: when bondholders fail to suffer a
cognizable loss (and therefore do not sue), and when citizens are
unable to monitor and discipline local officials through the political process (a problem exacerbated by the frictions of exit), action by the SEC ensures that local officials who lie—and the
administrations that aid them—are held accountable for the
losses that they imposed on their constituencies. The argument
is compelling, but a deeper consideration of the costs of SEC enforcement suggests that it is not as elegant a solution to local
mismanagement as it first appears.
To begin, there are obvious and nonobvious predictions to be
made about the costs that the SEC’s novel enforcement
measures will impose on cities and taxpayers. The SEC’s belief
that liability through monetary penalties is “the most effective de-

219 Opinion of the Commission, In the Matter of Dolphin and Bradbury, Inc and
Robert J. Bradbury, Securities Act of 1933 Release No 8721, SEC Administrative Proceeding No 3-11465, *16 (July 13, 2006) (“Bradbury Opinion”). This opinion upheld an
SEC cease and desist order against the underwriter of a municipal issuance by a local
authority in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The SEC charged the underwriter with violations of §§ 17(a) and 10(b) of the federal securities laws. Id at *1–3.
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terrent”220 seems facially plausible: increasing the stakes of producing false or misleading statements may well induce local officers to take a more measured approach to financial disclosures.221
But the other, perhaps more likely eventuality is that targeted personal liability, in addition to the broader risk of penalties imposed directly on municipalities themselves, will deter involvement in local government altogether. In combination, the
SEC’s recent first-of-their-kind enforcement methods make it increasingly riskier for private individuals to assume roles of authority in local government, and, moreover, these enforcement
methods fail to define the potential scope and magnitude of
those risks.
The Supreme Court has expressed precisely the same concerns in rejecting the notion that individual officers should be
liable for damages in private suits brought under 42 USC
§ 1983. 222 In Anderson v Creighton, 223 the Court observed that
“permitting damages suits against government officials can entail substantial social costs, including the risk that fear of personal monetary liability and harassing litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.” 224 The Court
reiterated this view more recently in Filarsky v Delia, 225 confirming that immunity from personal monetary liability “protect[s]
government’s ability to perform its traditional functions . . . by
helping to avoid unwarranted timidity in performance of public
duties, ensuring that talented candidates are not deterred from
public service, and preventing the harmful distractions from
carrying out the work of government that can often accompany
damages suits.”226 Immunity from the threat of damages further
“gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable
but mistaken judgments” about their obligations under the law.227
Some empirical research has already begun to identify personnel problems as an obstacle to effective local governance. A
Glazier, SEC’s Top Cop (cited in note 83) (quoting remarks by Ceresney).
On the other hand, “there is little evidence of [monetary penalties’] effectiveness
in deterring securities law violations.” Steinway, Comment, 124 Yale L J at 222 (cited in
note 80).
222 As further discussed in Part III.B, the Supreme Court has not yet considered the
propriety of individual monetary liability in the context of other federal statutes, including the federal securities laws.
223 483 US 635 (1987).
224 Id at 638.
225 132 S Ct 1657 (2012).
226 Id at 1665 (quotation marks omitted).
227 Ashcroft v al-Kidd, 131 S Ct 2074, 2085 (2011).
220
221
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detailed study of four distressed suburbs of industrial cities recently cited “high turnover among city professional staff due to
poor working environments and low wages” as a factor in local
financial struggles. 228 The study concludes that “when cities
cannot offer competitive wages and potential municipal employees don’t see a career track because of political instability, they
experience high staff turnover,” exacerbating existing management and governance issues. 229 This research is troubling in
light of the Supreme Court’s prediction that the threat of individual financial liability would deter “talented candidates . . .
from entering public service.” 230
In fact, an increase in personnel upheavals or a further
shrinking of the pool of willing candidates for public service
would only further complicate the SEC’s goal of improving internal disclosure processes. Recall that the Allen Park cease and
desist order—like several of the orders that came before it—
required the city to designate counsel to train all personnel involved in the city’s bond-offering and disclosure processes. 231 Recall, too, that the SEC’s action against Allen Park resulted in
severe sanctions against the city’s mayor, Burtka, who agreed—
under a theory of derivative control person liability—to pay a
$10,000 penalty and to permanently refrain from participating
in any future municipal bond offering. 232 Functionally, this provision is likely to act as a bar on the former mayor’s ability to
assume a position of leadership in local government except in a
limited, nonfinancial role, even though he was not found to be a
principal violator of the federal securities laws. The stigma of an
SEC fraud settlement is certain to make him a weaker candidate for elected office in any capacity. More precisely, any city
that contemplates electing or hiring the former mayor would have
to take great pains to segregate his duties and responsibilities
from any debt financing activities. Given how commonly local
governments and agencies—including school districts and public
228 Kathryn W. Hexter, et al, Revitalizing Distressed Older Suburbs *18 (Cleveland
State University, Nov 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/9T8D-3D3P.
229 Id at *22–23.
230 Filarsky, 132 S Ct at 1665.
231 Allen Park Order at *6 (cited in note 121).
232 Under the terms of the settlement, Burtka “is permanently barred from participating in an offering of municipal securities . . . including engaging in activities with a
broker, dealer, or issuer for purposes of issuing, trading, or inducing or attempting to
induce the purchase or sale of any municipal security.” Burtka Final Judgment at *2
(cited in note 124).
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utilities—use the public debt market to raise capital, 233 such
segregation may be impracticable in all but a few isolated cases.
It is, of course, difficult to discern precisely how the SEC sanctions will impact the political career of an individual like Burtka, but it is fair to conclude that he is now a far less compelling
candidate for local government service. If political instability
and low wages led to problematic staff turnover in four closely
studied American localities, then legal uncertainty and heightened risks of liability for higher-level public service positions
will surely pose unprecedented personnel challenges for this
troubled Detroit suburb. To be sure, a city that cannot attract
talented candidates for finance-related roles will have a difficult
time developing and implementing a comprehensive and functional financial-disclosure system.
It is an obvious argument, but one worth making: imposing
heightened scrutiny and possible monetary penalties on local
governments and public officials while simultaneously lowering
the legal barriers (indeed, demolishing some preexisting barriers) to individual liability will be costly to local governments. It
will make it more difficult for issuers to hire or elect professionals with the right level and scope of expertise—as well as the
right level of risk aversion—to fill financial and higher-level
government roles. An inability to employ well-qualified decisionmakers will lead to tighter local budgets, less sophistication
in local decisionmaking, and potentially riskier investment and
financing decisions. And greater volatility of risk at the local
level naturally implicates state governments, who often step in
to bail out failing municipalities that are unable to raise and
manage capital of their own. 234 This is especially true if local
governments remain reluctant to default.
To be sure, the costs of legal uncertainty and of direct SEC
penalties will ultimately be felt by local budgets and the taxpayers who fund them. Penalties exacted against a municipal
government will most likely draw from the city’s operating
funds; so, too, will monetary penalties secured against local ofAs the SEC has explained, the municipal securities market is crucial to local development, and numerous local entities regularly access the market “to finance a wide
variety of public projects, to provide for cash flow and other governmental needs, and to
finance non-governmental private projects.” SEC, Report on the Municipal Securities
Market at *i (cited in note 1). For an indication of the diversity of local entities that rely
on public debt financing, see Appendix.
234 See, for example, The State Role at *20 (cited in note 142) (analyzing recent instances of state intervention to prevent local insolvency).
233
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ficers be drawn indirectly from the local fisc, as professionals
considering any role of financial responsibility within a municipality will likely seek higher compensation or another form of
assurance against the threat of liability. 235 The Supreme Court
itself is sensitive to the problem of pass-through in the municipal context; the Court has reasoned that “municipal liability for
punitive damages awards would punish innocent taxpayers, not
actual wrongdoers, and therefore considerations of public policy
militate[ ] against expanding punitive damages liability to encompass municipalities.” 236 Even in the recent cases in which the
SEC has not imposed direct penalties on local governments or
officials, the burdens, risks, and uncertainties that accompany
SEC enforcement will ultimately make local governance and municipal borrowing more costly for local citizens in the long term.
D. Transparency and the Risk of Overexposure
Of course, not all costs are undesirable, especially if those
costs incentivize issuers to reform their disclosure practices in
socially beneficial ways. Indeed, economic theory and financial
research establish that improvements in primary market
transparency can work to reduce transaction costs for market
participants in both the corporate and the municipal contexts.237
235 The issue of public sector compensation is complex and varies across jurisdictions. Empirical work in this area is also relatively undeveloped. According to one recent
study by economists at the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “data suggest that public sector
workers, especially local government ones, on average, receive greater remuneration
than observably similar private sector workers.” Maury Gittleman and Brooks Pierce,
Compensation for State and Local Government Workers, 26 J Econ Persp 217, 218 (2011).
They note that the forces driving this public/private differential are unclear and could
involve a combination of agency considerations, political interests, bargaining, and legal
constraints on local expenditures, all of which have varying impacts on pay structures
for public employees. Id at 239. The key point here is that compensation at the local level
is not fixed and can be influenced by a variety of social and political factors. The increased legal risks of assuming a position of authority in local government could, as a
theoretical matter, have a significant impact on the wage and benefit structures that individuals may seek in assuming public office. And if, as a hypothetical matter, financially stressed municipalities are unable to raise compensation to account for heightened
risks in assuming public office, some candidates—especially those with transferable finance and accounting skills, such as candidates for budget-management-type positions—
may be incentivized to switch to the private sector, in which slightly lower compensation
levels could be offset by lower risks of personal liability. This is an area worthy of further
investigation in light of the SEC’s increasing focus on individual monetary penalties.
236 Walters v City of Atlanta, 803 F2d 1135, 1148 (11th Cir 1986), citing City of Newport v Fact Concerts, Inc, 453 US 247, 259–66 (1981) (emphasis added).
237 For further discussion of such theories, see Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R.
Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 280–85 (Harvard 1996) (arguing that
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Recent studies of the municipal bond market have documented
that, in defined markets, structured disclosure practices and
more-uniform accounting methods have allowed issuers to offer
lower interest rates to investors, which in turn allows issuers to
access the capital markets more cheaply. 238 Investors in local
governments that have, for example, made key financial data—
like budget reports and cash flow projections—readily available
online will theoretically be willing to accept less favorable repayment terms in exchange for the greater investment certainty
that online disclosures provide. 239
Improvements in market transparency can also generate
“information spillover”—positive externalities that result when
local citizens gain greater access to reliable data on the financial
health of their localities as a result of better investor communication. 240 A more informed electorate is undoubtedly an added
safeguard against mismanagement and fraud.
As a baseline rule, then, transparency has concrete value for
issuers, investors, and citizens alike. 241 But there are (at least)
antifraud rules have the effect of lowering borrowing costs for firms by incentivizing
more-accurate disclosure practices). For empirical studies of disclosure practices in the
municipal securities market, see Tiankai Wang, Patricia Shields, and Yangmei Wang,
The Effects of Fiscal Transparency on Municipal Bond Issuances, 35 Mun Fin J 25, 26,
42 (2014) (observing that “accessibility of fiscal information disclosure, such as online
budget reports, can decrease issuers’ borrowing costs,” but finding that there are “limits
to the value of transparency”); Lisa M. Fairchild and Timothy W. Koch, The Impact of
State Disclosure Requirements on Municipal Yields, 51 Natl Tax J 733, 740, 750 (1998)
(studying the impact of state disclosure requirements on interest rates).
238 See Fairchild and Koch, 51 Natl Tax J at 750 (cited in note 237) (finding that net
interest cost—the cost that issuers must pay to borrow—is, on average, lower for comparable issues in states that impose direct disclosure requirements on municipal issuers);
William R. Baber and Angela K. Gore, Consequences of GAAP Disclosure Regulation: Evidence from Municipal Debt Issues, 83 Accounting Rev 565, 568 (2008) (finding that
“state-imposed requirements on municipalities to use GAAP accounting are associated
with lower municipal debt costs”).
239 See Wang, Shields, and Wang, 35 Mun Fin J at 26 (cited in note 237). See also
Mark Robbins and Bill Simonsen, The Quality and Relevance of Municipal Bond Disclosure: What Bond Analysts Think, 31 Mun Fin J 1, 9–16 (2011) (finding that professional
bond analysts would value easier access to documents such as budget projections, cash
flow statements, and capital improvement plans).
240 Baber and Gore, 83 Accounting Rev at 570 (cited in note 238) (explaining the liquidity benefits that accrue to lenders when there is increased market transparency).
241 Recent efforts to overhaul and improve disclosure processes in Massachusetts are
strong evidence that issuers can benefit from becoming more transparent. Among other
things, the state has launched a website, Massbondholder.com, to provide investors with
comprehensive data and real-time updates on the state’s finances. See Jeffrey Burger, et
al, Municipal Industry Roundtable: Trends and Developments, 34 Mun Fin J 51, 51, 54–
57 (2014) (describing the initiatives that Colin MacNaught, the assistant treasurer for
Massachusetts, has helped develop in the state). Note, however, that Massachusetts is
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two caveats to this baseline rule in the municipal context, and
the SEC’s disclosure-forcing efforts fail to take these caveats into account.
1. The costs and benefits of transparency.
The first caveat is that disclosure—whether voluntary or
mandated by state or federal regulation—makes economic sense
only if the savings and other nonmonetary benefits it generates
exceed the costs of implementation. Recent empirical work has
only just begun to investigate this trade-off. Consider, for instance, a 2008 study of borrowing costs for municipalities required by state law to use generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) in bond disclosures. 242 Researchers found,
consistent with the baseline rule, that debt financing costs—that
is, interest that cities pay to borrow from the public—were lower
in GAAP states than in states with unregulated disclosures.243
These researchers note, however, that their findings “should be
interpreted cautiously, [ ] as [they] do not consider the costs of
disclosure regulation, which potentially exceed benefits realized
in debt markets.” 244 They further note that disclosure costs are
“likely to be more substantial” for smaller municipalities. 245 The
study is a useful starting point for understanding the value of
transparency in the primary debt market, but more research is
needed to clarify the interplay between borrowing costs, disclosure costs, and regulation, as well as to define how such costs
might impact localities of different sizes with varying financial
profiles.
In a recent, slightly more theoretical study of issuer disclosure, researchers confirmed that there is an optimal level of
transparency beyond which the costs exceed the benefits. 246 The
analysis demonstrated that a moderate level of fiscal transparency
provides the lowest borrowing costs for issuers, while both high
and low levels of transparency yield higher borrowing costs. 247 In
among the top five wealthiest states in the nation and ranks sixth in the nation in taxes
paid per capita. See Richie Bernardo, 2014’s Richest and Poorest States (WalletHub), archived at http://perma.cc/5WA4-WLDZ (compiling data from the US Census Bureau, the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the IRS).
242 See generally Baber and Gore, 83 Accounting Rev 565 (cited in note 238).
243 Id at 589.
244 Id at 568 (emphasis added).
245 Id.
246 Wang, Shields, and Wang, 35 Mun Fin J at 36–37 (cited in note 237).
247 Id at 42.
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other words, there is a “sunlight/overexposure tradeoff ” in fiscal
disclosure: some transparency is profitable, but too much can
leave local governments worse off. 248 The authors of this study
emphasize that the empirical study of fiscal transparency at the
local level is “inchoate in both theory and practice” and call for
further investigation. 249
The question of information spillover—that is, the possibility that citizens will benefit from better financial transparency
within their localities—also demands additional thought. Consider the case of Kansas. 250 The subject of the SEC’s cease and
desist order with the state was its failure to disclose to investors, through formal bond-offering documents, the fact that the
state pension system was grossly underfunded. 251 But even if one
concedes that investors may have suffered from this omission,
the “repeated[ ]” discussion of the underfunding in “various local
newspapers” 252 would likely have provided local citizens with
sufficient notice of the problem to correct it through the political
process. The governance failures that led to the pension crisis in
Kansas cannot necessarily be attributed to citizens’ lack of
awareness. As a result, the formalized disclosure systems that
the SEC has sought to impose on local issuers 253 will not always
provide incremental transparency benefits to citizens. If improved disclosure also fails to provide net monetary savings in
the bond market, it lacks a policy justification altogether.

Id.
Id. There is, of course, substantial writing on disclosure practices and costs of
regulatory compliance in the corporate context, but researchers in this area caution that
“important differences between the public and private sectors” counsel against “importing results from publicly traded companies into the context of municipal debt.” Baber
and Gore, 83 Accounting Rev at 570 (cited in note 238). This Comment does not engage
in such comparisons, but other scholarship has. See, for example, Chung, 34 Cardozo L
Rev at 1520–24 (cited in note 1) (arguing that municipalities should be subject to the
same fiduciary principles that apply in the corporate context); Gabaldon, 34 J Corp L at
761 (cited in note 43) (positing that the only reason to regulate public issuers differently
than private issuers is to avoid the mistakes that have been made in the private sector).
This is an area that is ripe for further investigation.
250 See Part II.B.
251 Kansas Order at *6 (cited in note 93).
252 Id at *4.
253 Recall that the SEC’s cease and desist orders by and large require issuers to
adopt more-formal disclosure policies and to provide training to the personnel involved
in bond issuances. See Part II.B.
248
249
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2. Elasticity of demand for municipal bonds.
The second caveat is that, at a certain point, a decrease in
interest rates could have a chilling effect on investor demand for
municipal bonds. As Part II.A discusses, municipal bonds are
appealing to individual investors because of their tax advantages and their low rates of default. These features allow
municipal issuers to keep interest rates lower than those on
comparable taxable bonds; in exchange for the tax exemption
and low default risk, investors accept lower yields. As the financial literature discussed above suggests, in many cases issuers
are able to lower interest rates in order to offset the cost of enhanced disclosure practices without driving investors to other
instruments. In other words, transparency has value, and many
investors will value it enough to accept still-lower yields on municipal bonds.
But naturally, there is a limit to this inelasticity. In theory,
if interest rates on municipal bonds fall low enough, investors
will begin to substitute away from municipal bonds and pursue
other investment sources that offer comparable or morefavorable returns. If an issuer’s interest rate falls below the level
that investors are willing to accept in exchange for the bundle of
benefits that municipal bonds provide, investors will simply
switch to the bonds of another municipal issuer, to taxable
bonds, or to other asset classes altogether. In other words, there
is a point at which demand for municipal bonds becomes highly
sensitive to interest rates, because investors can easily find substitute investments that will better maximize their returns.254
As with the costs and benefits of disclosure, research into the
nature of portfolio shifting in the municipal bond market is underdeveloped. 255 It is therefore imperative for decisionmakers
and courts to carefully consider how the SEC’s recent activity
might impact investor behavior going forward.
As a starting point, it is useful to conduct a closer analysis
of the costs of the SEC’s new frontier. As the recent cease and
desist orders tend to show, there are two distinct categories of
costs that flow from the SEC’s new enforcement regime. Most
254 See, for example, Poterba and Verdugo, 64 Natl Tax J at 595–98 (cited in note
176) (discussing the various ways in which individual investors can adjust their portfolios
in response to changes in the municipal bond market).
255 Id at 595 (“[R]elatively little empirical work informs the set of portfolio adjustments that may result from a change in the tax treatment of state and local government
bonds.”).
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immediately, local issuers facing SEC sanctions incur what
might be termed “enforcement costs”: the monetary and nonmonetary burdens that flow directly from SEC enforcement actions. These costs include (but are not limited to) the direct
monetary penalties that the SEC has imposed in some cases, as
well as the costs of legal defense, possible reputational harm,
and general uncertainty resulting from the SEC’s novel theories
of liability.
The second category, which involves what might be termed
“transparency costs,” captures the expenditures these cities
must make to comply with the SEC’s new disclosure demands.
As a condition of its deal with Allen Park, for example, the SEC
has required that the city engage disclosure counsel to develop
more-robust internal accounting procedures and to train personnel in financial-reporting processes and best practices. 256
There is little doubt that the plan will be costly and administratively challenging, especially given the city’s current state of financial distress. But if investors believe that the plan can be
implemented effectively and that it would add value to their investments, they may be willing to accept lower rates to compensate Allen Park for the costs of implementation.
Investors are much less likely, however, to accept still less
favorable rates in order to compensate issuers for the enforcement costs resulting from SEC intervention. This may prove especially true in places like Allen Park, where the city has gone
to great lengths to avoid default and ensure that investors are
repaid under the terms of the bond contract, as well as in places
like Kansas, where any vigilant bondholder was already in a
position to stay abreast of the financial condition of the city by
monitoring local media. The market may be willing to bear
transparency costs up to a certain point, but the added input of
enforcement costs may make municipal bonds as a whole—or
the individual bonds hit hardest by SEC scrutiny—less attractive than other classes of securities. In the end, SEC intervention could prove costly enough to dampen investor interest altogether. This would have the unwanted effect of impairing local
governments’ access to capital—a consequence that would be especially problematic at a time when responsible, well-planned
public borrowing could provide a much-needed source of liquidity
and funding for suffering cities and towns.
256

See Part II.B.
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***
The ultimate point of this analysis is that the SEC is doing
in two steps something that could be done in one. From a policy
perspective, it is fair to say that local governments should be
able to invest in affordable levels of transparency without significantly hindering their ability to borrow; transparency will benefit bondholders by providing better grounds for risk analysis,
and it has the potential to empower citizens to act as moreeffective monitors of local decisionmaking. But the SEC’s efforts
to incentivize better transparency through a costly, opaque punitive regime adds an additional layer of short- and long-term
burdens that do not significantly benefit any stakeholders in
this market and may, in the most extreme cases, deter bond investment altogether.
Luckily, there are less costly ways to achieve greater transparency. Before examining these alternatives, it is important to
first situate the SEC’s new frontier within the existing legal regime. In so doing, it will become apparent that the SEC’s new
enforcement frontier is not only a costly means of achieving fiscal transparency but a legally unsound one as well.
III. DOCTRINAL NOVELTY THROUGH THE REGULATORY
BACK DOOR
While the SEC has not technically acted outside its authority
in pursuing issuer fraud with greater intensity and coordination,
it has pushed the limits of individual and entity liability into
uncharted territory. Indeed, the novelty of the SEC’s theories of
liability has not gone unnoticed by the broader legal community.
In March 2015, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court on behalf of the city
of Miami’s former budget director, who lost his appeal for a qualified immunity defense in the Eleventh Circuit. 257 The Boudreaux petition challenged the Eleventh Circuit’s denial of the
immunity defense and broadly questioned the propriety of SEC
suits for monetary penalties against individual officers, 258 as discussed further in Part III.B. This petition and the doctrinal
questions it raises are ample evidence of the legal complexity of
the SEC’s new enforcement strategies.

257
258

See generally Boudreaux Petition (cited in note 117). See also Part I.C.3.
Boudreaux Petition at *i (cited in note 117).
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This Part investigates the doctrinal underpinnings of the
SEC’s enforcement frontier and provides a framework for further examination. Part III.A addresses the text and history of
the Tower Amendment, which signal a congressional intent to
limit the SEC’s role in local fiscal decisionmaking. Part III.B revisits the distinct theories of liability that the SEC has recently
pursued and flags the doctrinal problems that those theories
pose. Finally, Part III.C discusses the implications of the SEC’s
preference for administrative action, which limits potential legal
challenges to its novel enforcement tactics.
A. The Looming Tower Amendment
If not for the Tower Amendment, the SEC’s new frontier in
municipal securities enforcement would look quite different. By
prohibiting the SEC and MSRB from “directly or indirectly” requiring any issuer of municipal securities to file any disclosure
documents in connection with primary bond issuances, 259 Congress expressed an intent not to subject municipal issuers to a
formal, federally administered disclosure regime akin to that
imposed in the corporate sphere. Nonetheless, neither the language nor the legislative history of the Amendment makes clear
whether Congress intended to allow the SEC to induce such disclosure through its antifraud enforcement powers. As this Section highlights, any court considering a challenge to the SEC’s
aggressive theories of liability—or weighing the propriety of
monetary penalties against public officials—must ground its
analysis in an interpretation of the Tower Amendment.
1. The text.
The text of the Tower Amendment does not expressly prohibit the SEC from using its enforcement power under the federal antifraud regime to induce or otherwise incentivize issuers
to provide accurate and timely disclosures to investors. Recall
the language of the Amendment:
Neither the Commission nor the Board is authorized under
this chapter, by rule or regulation, to require any issuer of
municipal securities, directly or indirectly through a purchaser or prospective purchaser of securities from the issuer, to file with the Commission or the Board prior to the sale
259

15 USC § 78o-4(d)(1).
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of such securities . . . any application, report, or document in
connection with the issuance, sale, or distribution of such
securities. 260
A plain language reading of this provision suggests that the SEC
does not overstep its authority when it uses fraud sanctions to
alter issuer disclosure behavior. First, the Amendment applies
only to attempts by the SEC to mandate disclosure “by rule or
regulation”—it does not expressly prohibit the use of “softer”
methods of inducement, like a penalty regime designed to incentivize better disclosure practices. The Amendment’s ban on indirect regulations is also narrowly defined: it applies only to regulation that might be imposed on “a purchaser . . . of securities
from the issuer.” This clause most plausibly implicates thirdparty underwriters, who facilitate a debt offering by purchasing
the securities from the issuing entity and reselling them to primary investors. SEC enforcement activity—even activity that is
designed to induce issuer disclosure—does not appear to be the
sort of indirect regulation that the Tower Amendment prohibits
by its terms.
Furthermore, the restriction technically applies only to
rules or regulations that would require issuers to file preissuance “application[s], report[s], or document[s]” directly with
the SEC or MSRB. 261 It does not, by its express language, prohibit
the SEC from creating any disclosure regime whatsoever—it only
limits the SEC’s ability to demand access to specified documents
prior to an issuance of debt. At a bare minimum, the language of
the Tower Amendment does not foreclose an argument that the
SEC is empowered to induce issuer disclosure by means of a punitive enforcement regime.
While the language of the Amendment is narrowly drafted,
the SEC has interpreted it to impose broad restrictions on its
ability to regulate the municipal securities market. This complicates any attempt to apply the Tower Amendment to the SEC’s
new enforcement frontier. Most straightforwardly, the SEC
maintains that, by prohibiting it from requiring issuers to file
disclosure documents directly with the SEC, the Amendment
prevents it from reviewing the content of those disclosures before securities are offered to the public. 262 This presumably lim15 USC § 78o-4(d)(1) (emphasis added).
15 USC § 78o-4(d)(1).
262 See Aguilar, Statement on Making the Municipal Securities Market More Transparent (cited in note 50) (explaining that “[r]epealing the Tower Amendment would allow
260
261
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its the SEC’s ability to identify and flag misrepresentations before they impact investment decisions. Reading the provision in
conjunction with the other filing exemptions applicable to the
municipal securities market, 263 the SEC has further concluded
that the Tower Amendment denies the SEC authority to “establish mandatory disclosure requirements for municipal offerings”
and to require issuers “to follow a uniform accounting standard” 264 on an ongoing basis.
Strictly speaking, the Tower Amendment’s language does
not unequivocally compel these conclusions. The SEC’s interpretation is tenable considering the broader regulatory framework
within which it operates, but the courts have not substantively
analyzed how far the SEC’s regulatory authority extends in this
context; nor have they considered whether the SEC’s view deserves deference in light of a fairly straightforward statutory
text. 265 Because the Amendment’s text is susceptible to both a
broad and a narrow reading, uncertainties remain regarding
how the SEC’s novel enforcement frontier interacts with Congress’s underlying intent. Because there appears to be uncertainty regarding the proper interpretation of the Tower
Amendment’s express and implied prohibitions, it is instructive
the Commission and the MSRB to require issuers of municipal securities to file disclosure materials for review before offering securities to investors”).
263 In general, municipal securities are exempt from the registration requirements
of the Securities Act and the reporting regime of the Exchange Act. See Part I.B.1. The
Tower Amendment complements these exemptions with a more direct prohibition on direct SEC oversight, as this Section and Part III.A.2 make clear.
264 Aguilar, Statement on Making the Municipal Securities Market More Transparent (cited in note 50).
265 Under Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 US 837
(1984), courts will defer to agency interpretations of statutory authority when congressional intent is unclear and the agency’s approach is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id at 842–43. But it is not clear how or whether Chevron deference
would be triggered in this context. Because the SEC’s enforcement activity and the penalties it has imposed are not, by themselves, founded on any questionable interpretation
of the SEC’s clear antifraud enforcement authority, a challenge to the SEC’s broader enforcement regime would have to allege that the regime as a whole—or, perhaps, the
disclosure-related terms of the SEC’s recent cease and desist orders—functions as de
facto regulation of issuer disclosure practices in contravention of the Tower Amendment.
Such a challenge seems unlikely, since the SEC is unambiguously empowered to impose
monetary penalties on issuers and local officials through antifraud actions and since respondents are free to challenge and reject the terms of proposed cease and desist orders.
It is interesting, however, that the SEC’s own interpretation of the Tower Amendment
has been narrow and restrictive. If a local issuer were able and willing to bring a substantive challenge to an SEC penalty as an impermissible “regulation” of issuer disclosure, the SEC’s narrow reading of the Tower Amendment could work in the challenger’s
favor.
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to consider the intentions expressed by the members of Congress
who originally advocated for the Amendment’s passage.
2. The legislative history.
While the Tower Amendment’s text may not expressly impede the SEC’s use of enforcement tools to induce disclosure, its
legislative history makes clear that, when it comes to subjecting
state and local actors to federal control, restraint is paramount.
Senator Harrison Williams, in introducing the amendment on
the Senate floor, stated that the provision was designed to
“make clear that the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board . . .
would not have authority to require State and local governments
to make disclosures about their operations,” and he emphasized
that “the bill [was] not intended to tamper in any way with prerogatives of State and local governments in their sale of securities.” 266 As Williams explained, “The amendment thus states
that the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board may not impose on issuers, directly or indirectly, disclosure requirements.
Surely there can be no argument with that result.” 267
As the record further reveals, “that result” seemed sound to
Congress for two distinct reasons. First, Senator John Tower
was confident that “[m]uch of [the] information” pertinent to local government operations—that is, the information most relevant to prospective investors—“will undoubtedly be made available [to the market] in any case.” 268 He further observed that the
SEC and MSRB can easily “obtain such information from municipal securities brokers and dealers, who already supply such information to investors” when they market and sell new debt issues. 269 Since private financial intermediaries have access to
pertinent issuer information and are already subject to regulation, there was no practical need, in Tower’s view, to impose disclosure requirements directly on issuers themselves. 270
266 Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, S 249, 94th Cong, 1st Sess, in 121 Cong
Rec 10736 (Apr 17, 1975).
267 Id.
268 Id at 10737. Tower did not explain precisely how relevant information “will [ ] be
made available in any case,” but the implication is that prospective investors can gain
information about a new issue from the private parties that act as intermediaries in the
issuance process. Id.
269 Id. Recall that the SEC retains the authority to impose regulations on private
parties involved in the municipal securities market—only issuers are exempt from disclosure regulation. See Part I.B.1.
270 121 Cong Rec at 10737 (cited in note 266).
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Second, and more importantly, Congress was clearly skittish about opening the door to federal intervention in state and
local financial affairs. Under the unequivocal heading “Regulation of Municipal Securities Professionals—Not Issuers,” a 1975
Senate committee report on the amendments states that,
“[a]part from the general antifraud provision, municipal securities are exempt from all substantive requirements. . . . The bill
does not in any way change this pattern, for the Committee is not
aware of any abuses which would justify such a radical incursion
on states’ prerogatives.” 271
The report does not articulate any concrete theory under
which federal intervention in local-bond issuances would violate
the Constitution or softer principles of intergovernmental comity; 272
nor does it precisely define its understanding of states’ prerogatives in accessing capital markets. The report also fails to specify
the type or magnitude of abuses that would, in Congress’s view,
warrant a “radical incursion” on those prerogatives. The historical context of the Amendment does, however, provide some insight: the 1975 Amendments were drafted in response to New
York City’s catastrophic near default on $600 billion of municipal bonds in that same year. 273 Apparently, a bond crisis of this
magnitude—resulting in a concerted bailout effort by the state
and federal governments—was not, in Congress’s eyes, sufficiently troubling to warrant a “radical incursion” on state sovereignty in financial affairs. 274 The bar to federal intervention in
disclosure practices thus seemed, in the view of the drafters of
the Tower Amendment, quite high.
A restrictive interpretation of the text of the Tower
Amendment—with its prohibition of both direct and indirect attempts to impose disclosure requirements on issuers—would be
reasonable, especially given the high threshold that Congress

S Rep No 94-75 at 44 (cited in note 45) (emphasis added).
The most straightforward constitutional concern would be posed by the Tenth
Amendment, which reserves to the states any powers not expressly delegated to the federal government. However, this concern has been dismissed as overly simplistic. See, for
example, Gabaldon, 34 J Corp L at 753–54 (cited in note 43). See also Woods v Homes
and Structures of Pittsburg, Kansas, Inc, 489 F Supp 1270, 1296 (D Kan 1980) (holding
that the Tenth Amendment did not prevent the federal government from interfering with a
local government’s issuance of industrial-development bonds, because the Tenth Amendment only protects the states’ ability to carry out “traditional governmental function[s]”).
273 See Gabaldon, 34 J Corp L at 742 (cited in note 43); Chung, 34 Cardozo L Rev at
1502–03 & n 230 (cited in note 1).
274 Chung, 34 Cardozo L Rev at 1502 n 230 (cited in note 1).
271
272
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seems to have intended to set on federal intervention. 275 If one
views the SEC’s new enforcement frontier in the way that this
Comment has framed it—as a second-best, backdoor disclosureforcing regime, or as a coordinated program designed to induce
certain ex ante disclosure practices through systematic ex post
punishment—it appears to violate the underlying intent, if not
the text, of the Tower Amendment’s proscription.
It remains true that municipal securities, as a class of instruments traded in interstate commerce, are subject to federal
oversight through the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.
And despite some initial debate, 276 federal courts agree that local
issuers (though not states themselves 277) are subject to private
rights of action for violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the securities laws, 278 which by implication makes them proper subjects of SEC enforcement actions. Moreover, states themselves
are not immune from suit by agencies of the federal government, 279 making the SEC’s settlements with New Jersey, Illinois,
and Kansas legally sound (though still entirely novel). But the
federal securities laws “must be understood against the backdrop of what Congress was attempting to accomplish,” 280 and in
passing the Tower Amendment, Congress was far more concerned with exempting state and local issuers from SEC oversight than it was intent on ensuring that they be subject to direct civil or SEC liability. In light of this legislative history, it is
reasonable to conclude that the SEC’s exercise of its implied
right to enforce the antifraud provisions against government issuers has begun to overstep the limits that Congress intended to

275 One scholar interpreting the applicability of the antifraud provisions to municipal issuers under the Tower Amendment has even insisted that a consideration of legislative history is essential to a proper reading of securities laws. See Margaret V. Sachs,
Are Local Governments Liable under Rule 10b-5? Textualism and Its Limits, 70 Wash U
L Q 19, 26–33 (1992).
276 Id at 25.
277 The Eleventh Amendment continues to shield states and “arm[s] of the state”
from private suits under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. Sonnenfeld v City and County of Denver, 100 F3d 744, 749–50 (10th Cir 1996) (concluding that
Denver was not an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because
it had significant autonomy in local affairs, had the power to levy taxes and issue bonds,
and had not shown that a judgment against it would be paid out of the state treasury).
278 See id at 746–47.
279 See Alden v Maine, 527 US 706, 755–56 (1999). It is also well settled that state
governments are included in the definition of “person” as applied to §§ 17(a) and 10(b).
See Part I.B.2.
280 Reves v Ernst & Young, 494 US 56, 63 (1990).
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impose on the federal role in municipal finance. This alone is
reason to question the legal propriety of the new frontier.
As if to confirm that its recent activity fits uneasily within
the framework of the Tower Amendment, the SEC has repeatedly
urged its repeal, as well as the elimination of municipal securities’ exemption from the registration and filing requirements of
the securities laws. 281 Some federal agencies and scholars have
agreed that removing the Tower Amendment’s restrictions and
allowing the SEC to create and enforce a comprehensive disclosure program would make good sense in terms of policy. 282 Other
key stakeholders—including the Council of State Governments—disagree and forcefully oppose repeal of the Tower
Amendment. 283 But until Congress makes a choice between the
competing legal and political considerations weighing on both
sides of the question, the SEC is constrained by the design of existing law.
B. The Unsettled Scope of Issuer and Officer Liability
If there is reason to be uncomfortable with the legal footing
of the SEC’s coordinated program—given its aim to induce morerobust disclosure practices through the Tower Amendment’s
back door—then there is equal reason to be concerned about the
means that the SEC has used to construct this coordinated program. Recall the four doctrinal novelties that have thus far
characterized the SEC’s new frontier: (1) For the first time ever,
the SEC has pursued enforcement actions against state governments. (2) The SEC has expanded the basis for fraud violations
to include any public statements made by municipal governments or officials, even outside the context of securities disclosures. (3) Monetary penalties against government entities and
officials were unheard of until 2010 but are now a central focus
281 See Aguilar, Statement on Making the Municipal Securities Market More Transparent (cited in note 50).
282 See, for example, State Budget Crisis Task Force, Report of the State Budget Crisis Task Force *5 (Jan 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/BD63-XR4W; Municipal Securities at *23–25 (cited in note 83); Gabaldon, 34 J Corp L at 769 (cited in note 43); Spencer
T. Bachus, Federal Policy Responses to the Predicament of Municipal Finance, 40 Cumb
L Rev 759, 793 (2010).
283 See generally Council of State Governments, Resolution on Rating Agency Reform and Preserving the Tower Amendment (Nov 2009), archived at
http://perma.cc/A3PQ-2H8R. See also, for example, National Association of State Treasurers, Resolution: Opposing Amendment or Repeal of the Tower Amendment (Oct 7,
2013), archived at http://perma.cc/47MK-78FP.
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of the SEC enforcement program. Furthermore, on an issue of
first impression, the Eleventh Circuit held that public officials
are not entitled to qualified immunity in federal enforcement actions for monetary penalties, bolstering the SEC’s enforcement
efforts. (4) The SEC has, for the first time, invoked control person liability to bring charges against a city official.
Very little case law has arisen from these doctrinal firsts,
due mostly to the fact that the majority of the SEC’s enforcement actions have concluded in administrative orders without
formal adjudication. 284 There is, however, considerable room for
debate about each of these distinct issues, and it is likely that
courts will face more-frequent challenges as the SEC’s enforcement activity intensifies. The remainder of this Section highlights the lingering legal uncertainties surrounding the SEC’s
new frontier and provides a starting point for deeper analysis.
1. The SEC has pursued enforcement actions against state
governments.
As a threshold point, it is not doctrinally troubling that the
SEC has pursued actions against state governments: while
states are protected from private suits under the Eleventh
Amendment, 285 the Supreme Court has definitively established
that states are not immune from legal actions by federal enforcement agencies. 286 Still, the sheer novelty of the SEC’s actions against states is ripe for potential legal challenges and
could be a site of controversy if the SEC’s activity in this area
becomes more aggressive.

See Part III.C.
US Const Amend XI (“The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign
state.”). See also Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1, 15, 21 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment’s protection of states from suits by individuals extends to the state’s own
citizens as well as to citizens of other states or foreign countries).
286 See Alden, 527 US at 755–56 (holding that “[s]overeign immunity [ ] does not bar
all judicial review of state compliance with the Constitution and valid federal law” and
pointing to an exception for suits “commenced and prosecuted against a State in the
name of the United States by those who are entrusted with the constitutional duty to
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’”).
284
285
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2. The SEC has expanded the basis for fraud violations to
include any public statements made by municipal
governments or officials, even outside the context of
securities disclosures.
The question of the scope of the public statements that may
form the basis of a fraud charge is thornier. In determining
whether corporate defendants have made “any untrue statement
of a material fact” warranting liability under Rule 10b-5, courts
look beyond representations made in SEC-mandated disclosures
and consider information included in press releases, public
statements by managers, court filings involving the company,
and information disseminated through general media channels. 287 This means, in turn, that statements made outside formal SEC disclosures can form the basis of a fraud claim against
corporate issuers. The SEC directly imported this approach into
the municipal context in its 2013 settlement with Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, in which it based fraud allegations on statements
made in the city’s budget report and in the mayor’s State of the
City address. 288 Again, there is no federal judicial precedent to
support the assertion that the full range of communications by
government officials to local stakeholders fits within the judicially created notion of the “total mix of information” under the
federal securities laws.
Indeed, there may be good arguments in favor of the SEC’s
view: in the case of Harrisburg, for example, the city had failed
to make any formal disclosures relating to its bond issuance at
all, supporting the inference that bondholders may have relied
on the public statements of city officials in making investment
decisions. 289 Nonetheless, the standard that the SEC announced
in its 2013 press release on the Harrisburg settlement—that all
public statements are part of and may impact “the total mix of
information available to the market” and that they can therefore
form the basis of fraud liability—is in dire need of a limiting
principle. 290 Marc Steinberg, an early commentator hailing from
the SEC’s Office of the General Counsel, considered the question to
be “controversial” six years after the Tower Amendment became

287
288
289
290

See Hazen, 4 Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation at § 12.9 (cited in note 68).
See Part I.C.2.
See Part I.C.2.
SEC, Report of Investigation (cited in note 99).
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law. 291 And, as Steinberg has highlighted, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York was sensitive
to this question in considering investor claims arising from the
New York City bond crisis: “In my opinion,” Judge Richard Owen
wrote, “interjection of the federal securities laws into clearly political affairs of local government would represent an unwarranted intrusion into the political life of the community.” 292
The normative intuition that certain elements of local government communication should be shielded from federal scrutiny—
muddy as that intuition may be—comports with Congress’s intent to prevent federal “incursion[s] on states’ prerogatives.” 293
In some cases, it may be easy for a court to distinguish between
purely political speech and public statements that are likely to
affect outside investment decisions. But as Part III.C discusses
in greater detail, the likelihood of courts reviewing this gray area in the near future is relatively low, which places the linedrawing discretion squarely with the SEC.
Furthermore, the SEC’s only formal interpretation of the
“total mix” standard in the context of a municipal bond issuance
creates more confusion than clarity. 294 Acting in its judicial capacity, 295 the SEC concluded in In the Matter of Dolphin and
Bradbury, Inc and Robert J. Bradbury 296 that disclosure of pertinent information through the “[p]ublication of a few articles in
local newspapers with limited circulation” and through “discussion at [local government] meetings” was not effective in making
such information “reasonably available” to potentially far-flung
investors. 297 Because regional newspaper stories and government hearings were too local to have reliably reached investors,
any disclosures made through those channels would not enter
the total mix of information applicable to investment decisions. 298 They would therefore not be sufficient to counteract the
291 Marc I. Steinberg, Municipal Issuer Liability under the Federal Securities Laws,
6 J Corp L 277, 281–82 (1981).
292 In re New York City Municipal Securities Litigation, 507 F Supp 169, 186
(SDNY 1980).
293 S Rep No 94-75 at 44 (cited in note 45). See also Part III.A.2.
294 Bradbury Opinion at *16 (cited in note 219).
295 In issuing the Bradbury Opinion, the judicial arm of the SEC was reviewing a
challenge to a cease and desist order imposed by an ALJ through the administrative
hearing process. See id at *2–3. See also Part I.B.
296 Opinion of the Commission, Securities Act of 1933 Release No 8721, SEC Administrative Proceeding No 3-11465 (July 13, 2006).
297 Id at *16.
298 Id.
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effects of material omissions or misstatements made in formal
disclosure documents. This approach generally comports with
the SEC’s case against Kansas, which relied on the principle
that local newspapers—which had extensively discussed the underfunded state of the pension system, even though formal disclosure documents failed to mention it—were not sufficiently accessible to investors to have qualified as sources of disclosure. 299
But this construction directly contradicts the result in the Harrisburg case, in which the SEC’s theory of liability hinged on the
presumption that a local speech by the city’s mayor and other
political communications were sufficiently available to investors
to have impacted their investment decisions. The lack of clarity
in the SEC’s approach signals the need for a more principled
standard by which to evaluate the potential impact of various
types of local public communications.
3. Monetary penalties against government entities and
officials are now a central—and controversial—focus of
the SEC’s enforcement program.
The novel question of local officials’ and governments’ liability for SEC monetary penalties (rather than mere injunctions) is
equally thorny. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida addressed the question squarely in Securities and Exchange Commission v City of Miami 300 in December
2013. 301 The court summarily rejected the city’s challenge to the
claim for monetary penalties with a straightforward—though
not entirely unobjectionable—statutory argument: the federal
securities laws allow the SEC to seek penalties against any
“person” who violates those laws; 302 “person” is statutorily defined to include a “government, or political subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality of a government”; 303 and therefore, the SEC
can seek penalties against municipal entities. 304
The city’s defense hinged on an analogy between SEC monetary penalties and punitive damages in civil suits: it argued
that the Supreme Court has long held that municipalities are

299
300
301
302
303
304

For a discussion of the Kansas case, see Part II.B.
988 F Supp 2d 1343 (SD Fla 2013).
Id at 1347–51. See also Part I.C.3.
City of Miami, 988 F Supp 2d at 1361. See also 15 USC § 78u(d)(3)(A).
15 USC § 78c(a)(9).
City of Miami, 988 F Supp 2d at 1361.
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immune from punitive damages, 305 that civil monetary penalties
will punish taxpayers without meaningfully deterring local officials from wrongdoing, and that SEC penalties imposed on the
city are therefore improper. 306 Without citing pertinent legal authority, the district court dismissed this analogy wholesale, writing that “a civil penalty does not serve the same punishment
goals of punitive damages, but instead is meant to provide disincentives to securities law violations.” 307
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit later held that public officers are not entitled to qualified immunity in SEC suits for monetary penalties, similarly reasoning that penalties serve a purpose fundamentally different from that of civil damages. 308 And
yet, the Supreme Court itself seems somewhat undecided on the
proper characterization of these penalties. SEC penalties, the
Court wrote in its 2013 decision in Gabelli v Securities and Exchange Commission, 309 “are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers.” 310 The petition for certiorari filed by
Chemerinsky on behalf of Boudreaux, Miami’s former budget director, argues forcefully that there is little logical reason—and
no legal reason—to draw a distinction between monetary penalties and monetary damages. The petition notes that the “Court
has been clear that the label used for the relief is not determinative when it comes to immunity; it is the financial effect on the
defendant.” 311 In fact, as the Boudreaux petition highlights,
much of the Court’s reasoning in upholding qualified immunity
against punitive damages has focused on the same downstream
social costs discussed in Part II.C of this Comment.
In Filarsky, for example, the Court noted that immunity
from civil damages “help[s] to avoid ‘unwarranted timidity’ in
performance of public duties” and ensures “that talented candidates [are] not deterred by the threat of damages suits from
305 See, for example, City of Newport v Fact Concerts, Inc, 453 US 247, 271 (1981)
(stating that “considerations of history and policy do not support exposing a municipality
to punitive damages for the bad-faith actions of its officials”).
306 Defendant City of Miami’s Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof, Securities and Exchange Commission v City of Miami,
Civil Action No 13-226600, *12–14 (SD Fla filed Nov 25, 2013) (available on Westlaw at
2013 WL 6823900).
307 City of Miami, 988 F Supp 2d at 1361.
308 City of Miami, 2014 WL 4377831 at *2–3.
309 133 S Ct 1216 (2013).
310 Id at 1223 (emphasis added).
311 Boudreaux Petition at *10 (cited in note 117), citing Edelman v Jordan, 415 US
651, 668 (1974).
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entering public service.” 312 Such precedent calls into question the
Eleventh Circuit’s strained distinction between private damages
and public penalties, and it counsels against eliminating immunity in SEC enforcement actions. Because the Court has declined to consider the issue, there remains room for contrary decisions at the district and appellate court levels. 313 Any court
considering this issue will necessarily face the same policy questions considered in Part II of this Comment. More importantly,
courts will also have to contend with the Supreme Court’s
straightforward views on the social implications of direct monetary liability, which seem to militate against the imposition of
penalties in these cases.
4. The SEC has invoked control person liability to bring
charges against a city official.
The scope of control person liability under § 20(a) of the Exchange Act is unsettled in both the municipal and the corporate
contexts, making the SEC’s use of the provision against the former mayor of Allen Park especially striking. 314 Most notably, the
standard that the SEC must meet to bring such a claim in the
corporate-securities context is the subject of a circuit split on
which much has already been written. 315 According to one recent
media source, the SEC may have made strategic use of the split in
its case against the former mayor of Allen Park. Interpreting remarks by an SEC enforcement official during a panel discussion
Filarsky, 132 S Ct at 1665.
In fact, there already exists a circuit split regarding whether the qualified immunity defense is available under federal statutes aside from § 1983, under which a vast
majority of immunity cases arise. The Boudreaux Petition sought resolution of this split.
Boudreaux Petition at *11–15 (cited in note 117).
314 The SEC’s action against Allen Park and its former mayor, Burtka, is discussed
in depth in Parts I.C.4, II.B.
315 See, for example, Brianna L. Gates, Note, The SEC on a Forum Shopping Spree:
SEC Enforcement Power and Control Person Liability after Dodd–Frank, 99 Iowa L Rev
393, 396–97 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court should strengthen SEC enforcement power and end potentially harmful forum-shopping by rejecting the strict “culpable
participation” standard for control person liability adopted by some courts); Michael A.
Bednarz, Comment, Let’s Be Frank: The Future Direction of Controlling Person Liability
Remains Uncertain, 46 Suffolk U L Rev 551, 551–53, 567–69 (2013) (tracing the history
of inconsistent standards for control person liability before and after Dodd-Frank and
anticipating a loosening by the Supreme Court); Brian A. Melhus, Note, Control Person
Liability: A Repudiation of Culpable Participation, 37 J Corp L 929, 949–50 (2012) (calling on either Congress or the Supreme Court to banish the “culpable participation”
standard so as to create incentives for control persons to exercise the oversight needed
for sound financial markets).
312
313
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on the state of the municipal securities market, the National
Law Review recently reported that the SEC seems to have pursued its § 20(a) claim against the former mayor because the
Sixth Circuit provides a “somewhat more flexible standard” for
proving such a claim. 316 The authors of the article further wrote
that, “[r]eading between the lines, it appears as if the SEC believed they had proof that Allen Park’s mayor was complicit in
the alleged fraud,” and the SEC thus seized “an opportunity to
use control person liability in a way that would . . . [deter] municipal officials around the country.” 317
The claims against the former mayor were never litigated,
making it virtually impossible for outsiders to gauge just how
“complicit” he may have been in the alleged misconduct. The
lack of a factual record also precludes a more thorough analysis
of how, precisely, control person liability can and should be applied to municipal government fact patterns. Perhaps what is
more troubling is the fact that the disparate views among federal
appellate courts regarding the bounds of § 20(a) liability—and
the possibility that the SEC will use the legal rules applicable to
one region of the country to influence behavior in others—
complicates local governments’ abilities to predict and plan for
the risks of liability for higher-level officials.
As with each of the four doctrinal novelties that this Section
has considered, there are policy and doctrinal reasons to look
closely and skeptically at the SEC’s new frontier. The question
remains how many of these novel cases will ultimately come before the federal courts for more-thorough judicial consideration.
C. The Problem of Procedural Opacity
Ironically, many of the SEC’s efforts to eliminate informational disadvantages and induce market-wide transparency have
been procedurally opaque. Between 1977 and 2014, the SEC has
brought a total of thirty enforcement actions against governmental entities for fraudulent municipal securities disclo-

John R. Regier and Breton Leone-Quick, Current and Former SEC Officials
Speak about Enforcement Issues concerning Municipal Securities (National Law Review,
Mar 13, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2JP7-D7MY (interpreting remarks by SEC
enforcement officials and noting that, “[f]rom [the SEC’s] presentation, it appeared as if
one of the reasons why the SEC chose to assert a Section 20(a) claim in the Allen Park
case was the somewhat more flexible standard for proving control person liability that
exists in the Sixth Circuit”).
317 Id.
316
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sures. 318 Of those thirty actions, only eight were pursued in federal court; the remainder concluded in swift administrative settlements. 319 Of the eight federal suits, four were settled shortly
after charges were filed, and settlement agreements have been
filed in two. 320
Market participants and academics alike have highlighted
the many reasons to be troubled by the SEC’s increasing preference for intra-agency settlement of charges under federal securities laws. 321 Most prominently, administrative proceedings bypass the federal judiciary, follow a swifter timeline than federal
proceedings, and do not provide defendants a right to discovery. 322 When a would-be defendant chooses to settle with the
SEC through administrative channels—as has happened in 73
percent of municipal securities cases as of June 2015 323—
settlement agreements are both nonprecedential and vague as to
the nature and theory of liability. 324
Issuers and other stakeholders in the municipal securities
market have recently raised concerns about their inability to determine precisely how to comply with the SEC’s as-yetundefined disclosure expectations from these vague settlement
releases. 325 The SEC has offered little guidance: The leader of
the Division of Enforcement’s municipal securities unit recently
responded to an issuer’s concerns by broadly stating, “Don’t lie,
cheat or steal. That’s the rule.” 326 The SEC’s recent self-reporting
program itself, with its vague promise of leniency for any issuers
who come forward with possible violations of the antifraud statutes, effectively endows the SEC with the power to define how
and with what level of intensity to pursue penalties against local
issuers. This is a strange policy to maintain in pursuing an ini-

See Appendix.
See Appendix.
320 See Appendix.
321 See, for example, Steinway, Comment, 124 Yale L J at 226–30 (cited in note 80).
322 See id at 226. See also Part I.B.2 (discussing the nature of SEC administrative
proceedings and the opportunity for judicial review).
323 See Appendix.
324 For an example of ambiguity in SEC settlement agreements, see text accompanying notes 94–96. See also note 96 (discussing the vague liability language contained in
the cease and desist orders against the states).
325 See, for example, Glazier, Gaunt (cited in note 88) (noting that bond lawyers
have expressed frustration over the vagueness of a recent settlement with the Kings
Canyon Joint Unified School District).
326 Id.
318
319
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tiative whose driving goal is to improve and clarify channels of
communication among key stakeholders in a unique market.
Of course, it could be contended that, as a general rule, the
nature and direction of any new enforcement regime will be unclear to market participants at the outset of its implementation.
It is not, therefore, wholly troubling that there is confusion on
the ground while the SEC considers and defines its priorities going forward. What is troubling, however, is the exceedingly low
likelihood that a municipal issuer with a fraught relationship to
the municipal bond market—a city like Allen Park, for example,
whose financial woes led to two years of state-mandated control
by an emergency manager—would decline to settle and would
choose instead to litigate fraud charges. Litigation is risky for
any corporate entity, and accepting a neither-admit-nor-deny
order is likely to appear to most municipal issuers as the lowestrisk option in the face of SEC scrutiny. It also may be more politically salient than a lengthy, publicized suit with the SEC.
These facts are convenient to a regulator seeking to bare its enforcement teeth without judicial involvement.
CONCLUSION: FISCAL DISCIPLINE AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
This Comment identifies two key problems currently facing
legal and political decisionmakers in the field of municipal finance. The first problem is familiar, but it remains complex and
unresolved: In the wake of the Great Recession, numerous cities
and towns have faced crippling financial distress, insolvency,
and even bankruptcy. And in many cases, the crisis was the direct result of poor governance and inadequate monitoring of local decisionmaking. 327 Scholars, regulators, and stakeholders
have agreed that greater fiscal transparency at the local level
would be a valuable first step toward better governance and
would carry with it the additional benefit of making the municipal bond market—a valuable tool in local development—function
more effectively for everyone concerned.
The second problem is one of design: What are the most effective means by which the goal of better governance through
greater transparency may be achieved? The SEC’s new frontier
in antifraud enforcement represents a strategy of “fiscal discipline,” founded on the notion that local decisionmakers can be
induced to exercise good fiscal judgment through the infliction of
327

See generally Anderson, 123 Yale L J 1118 (cited in note 137).
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pain in the right places. 328 As Professor Schragger has observed,
“[e]fforts to discipline states and local governments assume that
profligacy is their central problem and that some external coercive force is necessary to restrain them.” 329 But scholars considering theoretical variants of the fiscal-discipline approach have
rejected it as misguided in the municipal context. 330 Notably,
Professor Anderson, in her comprehensive analysis of the causes
and outcomes of municipal distress, has concluded that
“[i]nsolvent cities need a safety net, not punishment.” 331 Schragger
has similarly argued that fiscal discipline—in the form of topdown controls on local government spending—is misguided and
ineffective in preventing local fiscal crises. 332
The foregoing analysis of the SEC’s new frontier confirms
these scholars’ concerns. As Part II demonstrates, the SEC’s disciplinary approach introduces costs into the municipalborrowing system that are likely to exceed the benefits that it
provides. And as discussed in Part III, the legal framework within which the SEC operates—especially the telling legislative history of the Tower Amendment—is inhospitable to the SEC’s attempts to redefine itself as a disclosure-forcing watchdog. At the
same time, the aggressive theories of liability that the SEC has
pursued in the name of local discipline have raised doctrinal red
flags and will have significant negative policy implications.
There are, however, alternatives to the SEC’s recently aggressive brand of fiscal discipline that will obviate the need for a
repeal of the Tower Amendment and avoid the enforcement costs
of the SEC’s regime while encouraging better financial practices
and more-open governance. Several academics have already
proposed approaches that involve cooperative efforts between
state and local governments, including opportunities for state
agencies to help counsel better fiscal decisionmaking at the local
level. 333 Finance scholars have considered similarly cooperative
approaches; one recent article has proposed the creation of an
interstate, nonprofit advisory firm, termed “CommonMuni,” that
would facilitate the exchange of information among issuers and
investors and provide local issuers with much-needed invest328
329
330
331
332
333

Schragger, 39 Fordham Urban L J at 793, 803 (cited in note 18).
Schragger, 121 Yale L J at 863 (cited in note 153).
See, for example, Schragger, 39 Fordham Urban L J at 795 (cited in note 18).
Anderson, 123 Yale L J at 1217 (cited in note 137).
See generally Schragger, 121 Yale L J 860 (cited in note 153).
See, for example, Shanske, 33 Rev Bank & Fin L at 802–03 (cited in note 59).
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ment guidance. 334 Most recently, a group of philanthropic and
academic organizations—including the Government Performance Lab at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, the
Center for Government Excellence at Johns Hopkins University,
and the Sunlight Foundation—have come together to launch a
nationwide transparency initiative called “What Works Cities.”335
The program will provide funding and support for the development of open data-management systems for one hundred
midsize towns and cities in the United States. The systems will
be designed to “elevate and accelerate cities’ use of data and evidence to engage citizens, make government more effective, and
improve people’s lives.” 336 Outside this new initiative, a few larger cities and towns have already begun to develop their own data-driven mechanisms for improving financial transparency in
order to benefit their residents. 337
Such initiatives are not costless to coordinate, but they
promise to provide constructive, ongoing benefits and long-term
savings that one-off SEC penalties (or looming threats of such
penalties) do not provide. Furthermore, and especially in the
case of the What Works Cities initiative, they focus pointedly on
the government-citizen relationship: by improving communication between decisionmakers and the people they govern, these
programs promise to empower citizens to become more effective,
well-informed monitors of local decisionmaking. By contrast, the
SEC is concerned narrowly with establishing a disclosure regime
that will “protect” the interests of individual bond investors,
without regard to whether investor-centric disclosures would be
effective or efficient in promoting local transparency and accountability more broadly. Troublingly, the undefined but looming threat of fraud liability that the SEC’s new frontier has constructed could make local governments and their officials think
twice about joining initiatives like What Works Cities or about
developing protransparency programs of their own. If a financially strapped local government fears that a seemingly minor
disclosure misstep or miscommunication (or the bad behavior of
an unsophisticated city employee) could result in fraud charges,
334 See Andrew Ang and Richard C. Green, Lowering Borrowing Costs for States and
Municipalities through CommonMuni, 34 Mun Fin J 43, 57–64 (2013).
335 See Partners (Bloomberg), archived at http://perma.cc/WB3S-64HD.
336 What Works Cities (Bloomberg), archived at http://perma.cc/J2YS-F5UM.
337 See Tod Newcombe, The Payoffs of Financial Transparency (Governing, Apr 16,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/F28W-K6JT.
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it will be hesitant to pursue a wide-ranging transparency initiative that would only increase its exposure to liability.
It is also important to note that it is not, as a general rule,
socially desirable to deter local governments from accessing the
public debt markets altogether. An increase in enforcement activity may help curtail blatantly fraudulent practices and outright deception by local issuers, but the undefined threat of potential liability for a wide range of government communications
is a blunt tool that could push local governments to avoid the
public debt markets and make greater use of private financing—
which does not require public financial disclosure—in order to
raise the cash necessary to resolve local liquidity problems and
recover from economic downturns. 338 Because local governments’
demands for capital are not abating, a regulatory regime that
discourages the use of public markets could have the undesirable result of further impeding progress toward better financial
transparency.
Regardless of how it is designed, the regulatory regime applicable to the municipal securities market should not—as a
normative, policy, or legal matter—have the effect of impeding
the organic, market-driven movement toward greater transparency that seems to already be in motion.
Going forward, the choice-of-means question may hinge in
large part on the courts’ treatment of the SEC’s new frontier.
Because administrative settlements reduce the likelihood of judicial review, courts will have limited but powerful opportunities
to send strong messages about the SEC’s approach, especially as
more enforcement actions are brought in the coming years. Effective judicial review of the SEC’s program will require a deeper
and more holistic analysis than the SEC has provided thus far.
When viewed on a case-by-case basis, it may seem appropriate
to lay penalties for wrongdoing at the feet of the wrongdoers—as
the Eleventh Circuit and the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida did in City of Miami. But in taking a broader view of the SEC’s new enforcement program, it becomes clear that a program of punitive enforcement will do more
harm to taxpayers than good to bondholders, all the while defying Congress’s clear preference for precluding federal regulators
from direct involvement in local borrowing. In future cases,
338 For a discussion of the costs of disclosure in public versus private debt markets
and local governments’ abilities to choose between the two, see Baber and Gore, 83 Accounting Rev at 570 (cited in note 238).
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judges considering the novel liability theories that the SEC has
put forward in this market should think carefully about the
systemic consequences of those theories, starting with the Supreme Court’s own realization that “municipal liability for punitive damages awards would punish innocent taxpayers.” 339 Now
that light has been shed on the misbehavior of various local government officials, stakeholders are in a position to make meaningful changes to improve the market. Thoughtfully considered
judicial rejection of the SEC’s new frontier would open up the
landscape for more comprehensive, cooperative, and efficient
means of improving local decisionmaking, benefiting bondholders
and taxpayers alike.

Walters v City of Atlanta, 803 F2d 1135, 1148 (11th Cir 1986), citing City of Newport v Fact Concerts, Inc, 453 US 247, 259–66 (1981).
339
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APPENDIX. SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST STATE AND
MUNICIPAL ISSUERS AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS 340

Action against

Nature of
Filing Date Proceeding

Status as of June 2015

Allen Park,
Michigan, and two 11/6/2014
former city officials

Respondents consented to cease
Administrative
and desist order as to city and
proceeding
lower-level official; $10,000 fine
against city
imposed on town’s mayor (firstever charges against a
Suit filed
municipal official under a
against city
federal statute that provides for
officials
control person liability (§ 20(a)
(ED Mich)
of the Exchange Act)).

Kansas

Administrative

8/11/2014

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order.

Kings Canyon Joint
Unified School
7/8/2014
District, California

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order (first
Administrative
settlement reached under the
MCDC self-disclosure program).

Harvey, Illinois,
6/25/2014
and one city official

Suit filed
(ND Ill)

Settled with city; final judgment
against city official for $217,115
and an injunction.

UNO Charter
School Network,
Inc, United
Neighborhood
Organization of
Chicago, Illinois

Suit filed
(ND Ill)

Settled (consent decree entered
on June 2, 2014, substantially
the same as an administrative
cease and desist order).

6/2/2014

The Greater
Wenatchee
Regional Events
Center Public
11/5/2013
Facilities District
and one city official,
Washington

District consented to cease and
desist order plus $20,000
penalty (first-ever monetary
Administrative
penalty imposed on a municipal
issuer); official consented to
cease and desist order.

Public Health Trust
of Miami-Dade
9/13/2013
County, Florida

Administrative

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order.

West Clark
Community
Schools, Indiana

Administrative

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order.

7/29/2013

340 Information compiled from Office of Municipal Securities, Information and Resources, Cases & Materials (SEC), online at http://www.sec.gov/municipal (visited Oct 23,
2015) (Perma archive unavailable).
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Miami, Florida, and
7/19/2013
one city official

Suit filed
(SD Fla)

Currently being litigated
(interlocutory appeal involving
the city official’s qualified
immunity defense denied by the
Eleventh Circuit on Sept 5,
2014; 341 certiorari denied by the
Supreme Court on June 29,
2015 342).

South Miami,
Florida

5/22/2013

Administrative

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order.

Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania

5/6/2013

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order (first-ever
Administrative charges involving public
statements made by
a city).

Victorville,
California, and
one city official

4/29/2013

Suit filed
(CD Cal)

Currently being litigated.

Illinois

3/11/2013

Administrative

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order.

8/18/2010

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order (first-ever
Administrative
enforcement action against a
state).

New Jersey

Respondents consented to cease
and desist order plus monetary
penalty (first-ever monetary
penalty imposed on city officials
for bond fraud).

Four city officials
in San Diego,
California

4/7/2008

San Diego,
California

11/14/2006 Administrative

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order.

Dauphin County
General Authority,
Pennsylvania

4/26/2004

Administrative

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order.

Neshannock
Township School
District,
Pennsylvania

4/22/2004

Administrative

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order.

Massachusetts
Turnpike Authority 7/31/2003
and one city official

Administrative

Respondents consented to cease
and desist order.

Miami, Florida, and
6/22/2001
two city officials

Administrative

ALJ imposed cease and desist
order.

341
342

Suit filed
(SD Cal)

City of Miami, 2014 WL 4377381 at *3.
Boudreaux v Securities and Exchange Commission, 135 S Ct 2890, 2890 (2015).
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Anaheim,
California, and
several other
entities

9/29/1998

Administrative

Respondents consented to cease
and desist order.

Newport-Mesa
Unified School
District, California

9/29/1998

Administrative

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order.

Moorhead,
Mississippi

9/24/1998

Administrative

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order.

Carthage,
Mississippi, and
several other
entities

7/13/1998

Administrative

Respondents consented to cease
and desist order.

County of Nevada,
California, and
several other
entities

2/2/1998

Administrative

Respondents consented to cease
and desist order.

Syracuse, New
York, and city
officials

9/30/1997

Administrative

Respondents consented to cease
and desist order.

Maricopa County,
Arizona

9/30/1996

Administrative

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order.

Orange County,
California, and
several other
entities

1/24/1996

Administrative

Respondents consented to cease
and desist order.

San Antonio
Suit filed
Municipal Utility
11/18/1977
(SD Tex)
District No 1, Texas

Respondent consented to cease
and desist order.

Whatcom County
Water District
3/7/1977
No 13, Washington

Settled (respondent consented
to cease and desist order).

Suit filed
(WD Wash)

